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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Tax Systems and Corporate Tax Avoidance: The Effect on MNC Location 
Choices and Firm Value 
 
Michael A. Baker, CPA 
 
December 31, 2016 
The following dissertation is structured as two related essays on tax systems and 
corporate tax avoidance.  
The first essay focuses on the firm level impact of a government’s transition from 
a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. Utilizing a case study approach, ten 
firms within the tax jurisdiction of the United Kingdom are analyzed pre- and post-
transition. Firm behavior is evaluated pre- and post-transition through firm level 
incentives to shift earnings and firm level utilization of tax havens (i.e. subsidiaries 
located in tax advantageous areas). Despite significant efforts put forth by governments 
to reduce corporate tax avoidance and tax haven utilization, case study findings reveal 
little evidence that territorial tax systems promote such firm behavior.  
The second essay focuses on the firm level change in share value, and the 
associated return to holding such shares, for firms that engage in corporate inversion. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are reviewed for a set of inverting firms to determine 
whether shareholders value corporate inversion transactions. In addition, this essay 
reviews the relationship between such cumulative abnormal returns and certain firm level 
incentives to shift earnings, tax haven utilization, and other firm characteristics such as 
permanently reinvested foreign earnings. Results reveal that the level of both 
permanently reinvested earnings and intangible assets impact the value shareholders 
place on the shares of firms engaged in corporate inversions.   
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1. Introduction 
The following dissertation is structured as two related essays on tax systems and 
corporate tax avoidance.  
The first essay focuses on the firm level impact of a government’s transition from 
a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. Utilizing a case study approach, ten 
firms within the tax jurisdiction of the United Kingdom are analyzed pre- and post-
transition. Firm behavior is evaluated pre- and post-transition through firm level 
incentives to shift earnings and firm level utilization of tax havens (i.e. subsidiaries 
located in tax advantageous areas). Despite significant efforts put forth by governments 
to reduce corporate tax avoidance and tax haven utilization, case study findings reveal 
little evidence that territorial tax systems promote such firm behavior.  
The second essay focuses on the firm level change in share value, and the associated 
return to holding such shares, for firms that engage in corporate inversion. Cumulative 
abnormal returns are reviewed for a set of inverting firms to determine whether 
shareholders value corporate inversion transactions. In addition, this essay reviews the 
relationship between such cumulative abnormal returns and certain firm level incentives 
to shift earnings, tax haven utilization, and other firm characteristics such as permanently 
reinvested foreign earnings. Results reveal that the level of both permanently reinvested 
earnings and intangible assets impact the value shareholders place on the shares of firms 
engaged in corporate inversions.   
1.1. Research Motivation 
Countries around the globe maintain unique methods of taxing multinational 
corporations (MNCs). The unique structure of a country’s tax system is evident in its tax 
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rate, tax laws and regulations and other components that directly impact MNCs. Tax 
systems also indirectly impact MNCs, their home-countries, and the foreign governments 
where the firm conducts business through branches and subsidiaries. As one might expect 
in an increasingly globalized environment, variation in methods of corporate taxation 
across countries impacts firm behavior. MNCs utilize their access to multiple tax systems 
across countries to lower their effective tax rates. Ideally, such “corporate tax avoidance” 
strategies allow the firm to achieve superior profit maximization as compared to 
competitors that lack access to varied tax systems. It is expected that firms benefit from 
(legal and allowable) corporate tax avoidance strategies assuming the savings realized 
from such strategies outweigh the organizational efforts to conduct, legally defend and 
maintain such strategies. 
Corporate tax avoidance strategies are implemented in various forms and include 
strategically locating subsidiaries in tax-advantageous countries, strategically locating 
and recording revenues to reduce tax liabilities, strategically sourcing debt to lower the 
corporate tax liability, and numerous other methods to be discussed in further detail. An 
obvious, yet important, effect of such corporate tax avoidance strategies is the reduced 
corporate tax revenue collected by governments. From the standpoint of governments 
based purely on governmental tax revenue, lower collected corporate tax revenues have a 
negative impact. Governments such as the United States have implemented numerous 
regulations aimed at reducing the benefits of corporate tax avoidance strategies. Many 
governments have gone as far as reevaluating and restructuring the entire corporate tax 
system while others consider a similar approach or implement piecemeal regulatory 
changes. 
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Literature focusing on international tax issues revealed certain firm-level 
incentives to shift earnings (Rego, 2003) (Seida & Wempe, 2004) (Desai & Hines, 2002) 
(Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008) (Kleinbard, 2011) (Gravelle, 2015) and provided 
empirical evidence that firms possessing such incentives are more likely to utilize tax-
advantageous areas (i.e. tax havens) (Richardson & Taylor, 2015). However, it appears to 
be that there is a gap in the literature regarding the firm-level impact associated with a 
government restructuring the corporate tax system.  
One of the more extreme corporate tax avoidance strategies involves inverting the 
corporate structure (i.e. the parent company becomes incorporated in a tax friendly 
foreign jurisdiction). Inversions have occurred since the early 1980s, but have varied in 
form and popularity. Assuming managers implement corporate inversion strategies only 
when they maximize shareholder value, and that markets are operating efficiently, one 
could reasonably expect shareholders to value the inversion positively and incorporate 
such value into the share price. In fact, the existing literature has examined the change in 
firm value associated with announcements of corporate inversions including (Desai & 
Hines, 2002) (Desai M. A., 2002) (Seida & Wempe, 2002) (Seida & Wempe, 2003) 
(Cloyd, Mills, & Weaver, 2003a) (Cloyd, Mills, & Weaver, 2003b) (Chorvat, 2016) and 
(Babkin, Glover, & Levine, 2016). Unfortunately, reported findings appear to be 
inconclusive as some studies point to share price declines in response to inversion 
announcements. 
MNCs that utilize corporate tax avoidance strategies often accrue and hold large 
amounts of earnings in foreign jurisdictions (i.e. Permanently Reinvested Earnings). Pre-
inversion, such earnings are not available to the firm to invest in its home-country 
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projects without paying repatriation tax. Post-inversion, the firm has the ability to access 
permanently reinvested earnings without incurring home-country corporate tax. 
Therefore, shareholders likely perceive value in the inversion announcement as the firm 
gains tax-free access to permanently reinvested foreign earnings. However, the relevant 
literature has not evaluated the change in firm value associated with announcements of 
corporate inversions of firms in relation to the level of permanently reinvested earnings.   
1.2. Overview 
Methods of taxing corporate earnings vary, but may be categorized into 
worldwide tax systems and territorial tax systems. Territorial tax systems tax only the 
earnings generated within the systems jurisdiction. Worldwide tax systems also tax 
foreign earnings of domestic MNCs. MNCs often operate in numerous foreign locations 
under both tax systems. The interaction between tax systems creates opportunities and 
challenges for both the MNCs and governments. Corporate tax avoidance methods offer a 
significant opportunity to the MNC in the form of tax savings and an equally significant 
challenge to the government in preventing the erosion of the tax base. 
MNCs utilize numerous (legal and allowable) methods of corporate tax 
avoidance. One such method is the use of “tax havens” or foreign locations with low or 
zero corporate tax. MNCs often take advantage of lower foreign tax rates by shifting 
earnings outside the higher taxed home country. The MNCs does not pay worldwide tax 
until earnings are repatriated to the MNC’s home country. However, this often leads to 
“trapped” earnings in foreign locations. MNC “cash hoards” may be viewed negatively 
by shareholders who demand that the firm allocate cash efficiently and effectively. 
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One method of accessing “trapped” earnings in foreign locations is corporate 
inversion. Corporate inversions result in the relocation of a MNC’s place of 
incorporation. Corporate inversions often allow the MNC to take advantage of lower 
corporate tax rates and access cash in foreign subsidiaries. Corporate tax avoidance 
methods utilizing tax havens, income shifting and corporate inversions have become 
increasingly popular as firms compete globally. This has led governments to transition, or 
consider transition, to a territorial tax system.  
This paper addresses three questions which each have direct implications as to 
MNC behavior and related firm value implications as well as indirectly inform the 
ongoing effort to determine which tax regime most successfully promotes MNC 
competitiveness and the government’s ability to collect the intended corporate tax rate. 
First, will a move to a territorial tax regime result in fewer MNCs utilizing tax 
havens? Second, will such MNCs have reduced incentives to shift earnings to tax havens? 
Finally, what are the firm value implications of shifted earnings which result in cash 
hoards located in foreign subsidiaries? Do shareholders place a higher value on the shares 
of inverting firms? In particular, those that have greater cash hoards or permanently 
reinvested earnings? 
For instance, would a transition to a territorial tax system benefit U.S. MNCs and 
the U.S. Government? Fortunately, we may look to the United Kingdom which recently 
(2009) transitioned from a Worldwide Tax System to a Territorial Tax System.  
1.3. Research Objective and Hypotheses 
 The first objective of this research is to determine whether firm behavior changes 
post-transition to a territorial tax system. Firm behavior may be examined by comparing 
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firm-specific pre- and post-inversion incentives to shift earnings. The literature described 
extensively in future chapters reveals certain firm-level incentives to shift earnings such 
as the degree of foreign operations as compared to domestic operations (i.e. 
Multinationality), pricing agreements and other transactions between related parties that 
do not meet an arm’s length principle (i.e. Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness), excess debt 
agreements under an arm’s length principle similar to Transfer Pricing (i.e. Thin 
Capitalization), non-monetary and non-physical assets (i.e. Intangible Assets) as well as 
the utilization of tax advantageous regions (i.e. Tax Haven Utilization). As described 
below, the transition to a territorial tax system is not expected to diminish a firm’s 
incentives to utilize tax havens or a firm’s subsidiaries located in tax havens. A case 
study method is used to examine firm behavior both before and after a home-country 
transition from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. 
 The second objective of this research is to determine whether firm value changes 
due to the announcement of a corporate inversion. In particular, in relation to the level of 
permanently reinvested earnings of inverted firms. As shown below, firms with higher 
levels of permanently reinvested earnings are expected to realize a more significant 
increase in firm value associated with the inversion announcement. An event study 
methodology is used to examine changes in firm value around the date of the inversion 
announcement. A subsequent Cross Sectional Analysis is used to examine certain firm 
characteristics, such as permanently reinvested earnings, in relation to firm’s abnormal 
returns as determined by the event study.  
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2. ESSAY ON WORLDWIDE AND TERRITORIAL TAX SYSTEMS: EARNINGS 
SHIFTING INCENTIVES AND TAX HAVEN UTILIZATION 
2.1. Overview 
The tax system employed by governments determine the types and methods of 
taxation imposed on corporate entities. Some governments tax only the domestic earnings 
of MNCs (i.e. earnings based on economic activity within domestic borders) and are 
known as Territorial Tax Systems. Worldwide Tax Systems tax both domestic and 
foreign earnings of MNCs within its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is often based upon the 
legal place of incorporation (POI), while some countries define tax residence with a form 
of management control test. 
Under the United States worldwide tax system, corporate entities are taxed based 
upon place of incorporation. That is, active business earnings of entities legally 
incorporated within U.S. borders are taxed at the U.S. corporate rate regardless of 
whether the source of earnings is domestic or foreign. The U.S. is well known for its 
relatively high corporate tax rate, but corporate tax rates also vary across jurisdictions. In 
fact, some tax jurisdictions are known as “tax-havens” in part due to a very low or 
nonexistent corporate tax rate (e.g. Bermuda, Cayman Islands, etc.). The United 
Kingdom also imposed a worldwide tax until 2009 when it transitioned to a territorial tax 
system. Under the UK tax system, corporate entities are taxed primarily based upon place 
of incorporation. 
Each jurisdiction also promulgates tax laws and regulations which impact the 
taxes imposed. Related laws and regulations define the activities subject to tax, as well as 
define activities eligible for tax credits and exclusions. As such, any two tax systems of 
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the same type, same activities subject to tax, or the same corporate tax rate do not 
necessarily impose the same tax. The resulting global structure of tax systems varying in 
type (worldwide vs. territorial), corporate tax rate, tax law and regulations (e.g. specific 
tax rules, tax credits, tax exemptions, etc.) is not only inherently convoluted but also sets 
the stage for arbitrage opportunities across jurisdictions.  
2.2. Literature Review 
2.2.1. Territorial and Worldwide Tax Systems 
Tax systems may be categorized into two theoretical models of taxation; 
worldwide tax systems and territorial tax systems (Kleinbard, 2011). These two models 
differ primarily in their approach to taxation of the foreign earnings of corporate entities. 
Domestic or “home-country” tax residence is often defined by the legal place of 
incorporation (POI). However, some jurisdictions look beyond the POI and apply a 
management and control test to determine the location of active central control (Cloyd, 
Mills, & Weaver, 2003a). The UK determines tax residence using both a POI test and a 
management control test (i.e. looks to the location of the highest level of corporate 
control), either of which might result in tax residency (Marian, 2015). However, prior 
literature has found that the UK’s management control test is either not consistently 
performed or not strictly imposed (Marian, 2015). The U.S. determines tax residence 
solely by POI test. 
Domestic earnings include parent company earnings generated within the tax 
jurisdiction as well as the earnings of any domestic subsidiaries (i.e. an entity in which 
the parent company has a controlling financial interest). Foreign earnings include the 
earnings of any subsidiaries outside the home-country tax jurisdiction (i.e. earnings of 
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foreign subsidiaries of a parent corporation which is located within the domestic tax 
jurisdiction). MNCs maintain various levels of ownership in foreign corporations. 
Taxable income may result from foreign ownership where the parent owns either a 
controlling or non-controlling stake (Kleinbard, 2011). Taxable earnings are generally 
determined by following generally accepted accounting principles applicable in the home 
country with certain adjustments as required by home country tax rules and regulations 
(Ernst and Young Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, 2015). 
One might expect that a pure worldwide tax system would tax all domestic and 
foreign taxable earnings of the corporate entities within its tax jurisdiction. However, in 
part due to an effort to avoid the double taxation of corporate entities, worldwide tax 
systems do not merely tax the sum of domestic and foreign earnings. Instead, worldwide 
tax systems reduce the amount of imposed tax by allowing some earnings to be excluded 
from taxable income, provide tax credits for certain activities and allow the deferral of 
tax in specific circumstances. Kleinbard (2011) argues that two deviations from a pure 
worldwide tax offered by the United States tax system result in significant reductions to 
imposed tax; deferral of foreign earnings and tax-sheltered interest and royalty payments 
to a parent company. These two types of deviations are not unique to the U.S. worldwide 
tax system.  
Corporate income tax on both domestic and foreign earnings is imposed on 
earnings in the year earned. However, deferral or “foreign reinvestment” of foreign 
earnings allows the foreign subsidiary to avoid home-country tax by holding foreign 
earnings in the foreign jurisdiction (i.e. not repatriating earnings to the home-country). 
While the original deferred amount is taxable at the foreign rate upon deferral, and will 
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eventually be subject to home-country taxation if repatriated (e.g. via cash dividend, 
intercompany loan, etc.), the deferred earnings are reinvested (often permanently) which 
leads to a “tax-exempt compounding of returns” (Kleinbard, 2011). That is, the firm 
realizes a compounding benefit to investing the earnings in the foreign jurisdiction pre-
domestic tax. There are restrictions and limitations on the earnings that may be deferred. 
Deferral is typically only permitted on the active business profits of separately 
incorporated foreign subsidiaries and not permitted on other less common earnings (as 
defined by Subpart F rules in the U.S.) (Desai & Hines, 2002) (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, 
& Twite, 2007). Subpart F rules impose non-deferrable tax on certain passive types of 
income (i.e. interest, dividends, annuities, rents and royalties) for subsidiaries that have 
influence over location decisions at the corporate level (i.e. Controlled Foreign 
Corporations) (Marples & Gravelle, 2014). U.S. Tax law identifies a “controlled foreign 
corporation” as one where at least 50 percent of the voting power or stock is owned by 
United States shareholders (Desai & Hines, 2002) (Gravelle, 2015). Controlled foreign 
corporations are subject to U.S. corporate taxation.  
For MNCs with access to multiple tax systems (e.g. parent resides in a low-tax 
territorial jurisdiction while the subsidiaries reside in a higher-tax worldwide 
jurisdiction), interest and royalty payments made by the subsidiary to the parent result in 
less taxable income in the higher-tax jurisdiction. While such “earnings stripping” 
methods are reviewed in more detail, it is important to note that the ability to conduct 
such activity is possible due to the variation in tax systems globally.  
Worldwide tax systems impose tax on worldwide earnings along with a complex 
set of tax exemptions and credits (e.g. Foreign Tax Credits or FTCs). The tax credits are 
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intended to mitigate double taxation by reducing the domestic tax burden for taxes paid in 
foreign jurisdictions. A U.S. MNC with $1,000 foreign earnings and a 35% U.S. tax rate 
would have a $350 initial U.S. tax liability on foreign earnings (i.e. assuming all foreign 
earnings were repatriated). The initial tax liability is then reduced by available FTCs. If 
the U.S. MNC paid $300 in foreign taxes to foreign governments, then it’s U.S. tax 
liability on foreign earnings would be $50. It is important to note that the $300 in foreign 
taxes may have been paid in numerous foreign jurisdictions. That is, rather than allowing 
credits to be applied against the domestic taxes imposed on the same economic activity 
originally taxed in a specific foreign jurisdiction, credits are applied more broadly to the 
overall tax liability (Gravelle, 2015). The U.S. MNC in the example above may have paid 
no foreign taxes in tax-haven jurisdictions while paying $300 foreign taxes in specific 
higher tax rate foreign jurisdictions. In the U.S. such “worldwide averaging” allows a 
high tax rate in one foreign jurisdiction to offset the corporate U.S. tax liability associated 
with a low foreign tax jurisdiction (i.e. but does not offset U.S. tax on U.S. earnings) 
(Foley, Hartzell, Titman, & Twite, 2007). In this effort, worldwide tax systems become 
something other than a pure worldwide tax system. That is, the U.S. is not simply taxing 
all foreign earnings at the U.S. corporate tax rate. When FTC rules are combined with the 
MNCs ability to defer recognition of foreign earnings, the MNC is able to strategically 
recognize earnings from foreign jurisdictions to maximize FTCs (i.e. minimize U.S. 
foreign tax liabilities). In fact, many argue that the resulting tax system effectively 
operates as a variant of a territorial tax system rather than a worldwide tax system 
(Kleinbard, 2011) (Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, 2009) (Marian, 2015). MNCs have 
developed extensive processes and strategic methods to utilize worldwide tax system 
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rules (e.g. tax exemptions, credits, deferral, etc.) to lower their tax liabilities arguably at 
or below that of territorial tax systems. 
Conversely, a pure territorial tax system taxes only the domestic earnings of the 
corporate entities within its tax jurisdiction. Territorial tax systems each have a unique set 
of complex tax law and regulations. For the purpose of this research, the key distinction 
between worldwide and territorial systems is the lack of tax imposed on foreign earnings.  
2.2.2. Firm and Home-Country Advantages 
The key elements of tax systems described above (e.g. tax model, corporate tax 
rate, and tax law and regulation including credits and exclusions) differ across tax 
jurisdictions. The unique combination of these elements in each jurisdiction create 
numerous differences that exist between the tax systems of countries around the globe. 
Such differences create both challenges and opportunities for the MNC. 
Traditional location theory, which focuses on the expansion of the MNC into new 
markets, recognizes that a profit-maximizing firm will choose a location where costs of 
production are lowest (Dunning, 1973). That is, assuming other market factors are held 
constant in a perfectly competitive situation. In the context of MNC taxation, the MNC 
must effectively make two location choices; a firm’s tax jurisdiction or “tax-home” and a 
firm’s operational headquarters or “operational-home”. An MNC may be legally 
incorporated in Bermuda and have its operational headquarters and management control 
in the United States. Firms do not necessarily need to relocate production to take 
advantage of the variation in tax systems. MNCs base their decisions regarding location, 
at least in part, on tax burdens. In particular, the tax burdens implied by the home-country 
tax system (Marian, 2015) (Devereux & Maffini, 2006). Much of the prior literature 
	 13 
examining the impact of corporate taxes on the location of the MNC has assumed that the 
operational-home follows or is the same as the tax-home (Huizinga & Voget, 2009) 
(Voget, 2010) (Barrios, Huizinga, Laeven, & Nicodeme, 2012) (Laamanen, Simula, & 
Torstila, 2012). Considering its limitations, prior literature has demonstrated the 
importance of tax considerations in MNC location decisions. Thus, the differences 
between tax systems becomes one of the structural market distortions that encourages 
MNEs to relocate one or both “homes”. If MNEs are able to achieve greater profits by 
relocating the tax-home, they may be able to achieve superior profit-maximization as 
compared to competitors.  
In addition, the differences between tax systems previously discussed create 
arbitrage opportunities that are discussed further in later sections. To the extent that firms 
are able to specialize in the methods of exploiting such opportunities, an ownership 
advantage is realized (Dunning, 1988) (Dunning, 2003). As such, the structure of specific 
tax systems and the differences between tax systems affords certain location and 
ownership advantages for the firm. However, one may also consider the home-country 
impact of such structural variation of tax systems. 
While firms realize certain positive effects of locating or relocating either the tax-
home or operational-home, the home country is impacted as well. The most apparent 
impact of a change in tax-home is the reduction in the tax base of the home country. As 
firms relocate the tax-home of parent companies outside of a worldwide tax system, the 
home country loses the right to impose tax on corporate affiliates (i.e. tax on subsidiary 
earnings considered foreign prior to the tax-home relocation). In addition, the impact of a 
change in operational-home must also be considered. There are numerous well-known 
	 14 
non-tax economic advantages to having the operational-home of a MNC located within a 
particular jurisdiction such as increased capital expenditures, research and development, 
learning and innovation, and employment (Marian, 2015). Desai (2009) refers to the 
relocation of such activity by classifying it into three “homes” including Managerial, 
Financial and Legal. A firm may relocate its legal home (e.g. POI) without moving its 
managerial home (e.g. location of executive management) or financial home.  
2.2.3. Tax Haven Utilization 
The variation in tax systems results in some jurisdictions being considered more 
favorable than others from a corporate tax perspective. Characteristics typically identified 
as favorable include a low corporate tax rate, territorial tax model, and other tax law, 
regulation and treaties that result in lower corporate effective tax rates. The most 
favorable tax jurisdictions are often identified as “tax havens” and have tax rates as low 
as zero percent. While there is no official definition of a tax haven, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has described the characteristics of 
tax havens including “zero or low tax rates, lack of effective exchange of information, 
lack of transparency and no requirement of substantial activity (Gravelle, 2015).” 
Countries considered tax havens by the OECD and relevant literature are listed on Table 
I. Aside from those listed by the OECD, other States and Countries are often considered 
tax havens including the U.S. State of Delaware (Dyreng, Lindsey, & Thornock, 2006). 
Such favorable tax systems may be utilized to conduct methods of corporate tax 
avoidance. Corporate tax avoidance methods include shifting earnings from high-tax 
jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions, structuring transactions to take advantage of the 
deductibility of certain expenses (e.g. interest expense) and other methods described in 
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detail below. While researchers continue to debate the amount of tax avoided by specific 
corporate tax avoidance methods, certain methods have been identified as most effective 
in avoiding corporate tax including intellectual property transfers, strategic debt 
allocation and strategic transfer pricing (Pak & Zdanowicz, 2002) (Grubert, 2003) 
(Gravelle, 2015). Such methods are often referred to as “earnings shifting” or “earnings 
stripping” and are more likely to be employed by tax-haven-utilizing MNCs with certain 
incentives.  
2.2.4. Earnings Shifting Incentives 
Previous studies on the association between earnings shifting incentives and tax 
haven utilization focus on tax haven utilization by publicly-listed U.S. multinational 
firms. Earnings shifting incentives found to be positively associated with tax haven 
utilization by U.S. MNCs include multinationality, transfer pricing aggressiveness, thin 
capitalization and intangible assets (Richardson & Taylor, 2015). Each of these 
incentives is described below along with the expected impact to each in the event of a 
home-country transition from a territorial tax system to a worldwide tax system. 
2.2.4.1. Multinationality 
Multinationality, or the degree of foreign operations as compared to domestic 
operations, has been found to encourage MNCs to participate in earnings shifting. The 
incentive to shift earnings increases as the proportion of foreign operations or foreign 
income increases (Rego, 2003) (Dyreng, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008) (Richardson & 
Taylor, 2015). As the number of MNC foreign locations increases, the MNC gains access 
to a larger number of tax systems. Such tax systems often offer lower corporate tax rates 
and variations in tax law that allow tax savings in many forms including shifted earnings. 
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Thus, as the MNC becomes more multinational, earnings shifting increasingly becomes 
one of the corporate tax avoidance tools at the disposal of the MNC.  
If the MNC’s home-country were to transition from a worldwide tax system to a 
territorial tax system, the tax-dynamic between the headquarters and subsidiaries would 
change. That is, the MNC would no longer be taxed on its worldwide earnings, the 
domestic corporate tax rate might also change and many domestic tax laws would likely 
be revised to accommodate the new tax system. However, the degree of change and 
related impact to the behavior of the MNC would be dependent on many factors 
including the corporate tax rate in the home-country versus foreign subsidiaries and the 
arbitrage opportunities or regulatory “loopholes” between each tax system as a result of 
specific tax law. Corporate tax rates and specific tax law vary between all tax systems 
whether worldwide or territorial in nature. Regardless, the more foreign subsidiaries the 
MNC has access to, the more opportunities it will have to utilize those that offer a lower 
effective corporate tax rate. In addition, other variations in specific tax law between 
territorial tax systems continue to facilitate corporate tax avoidance through regulatory 
arbitrage. Thus, despite a transition from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax 
system, multinationality will likely continue to promote tax haven utilization. 
2.2.4.2. Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness (TPA) refers to the nature of pricing agreements 
and other transactions between related parties. Kleinbard (2011) distinguishes between 
three common transfer pricing strategies including (1) the aggressive use of “cost 
sharing” arrangements that allow low-taxed foreign subsidiaries to utilize and sub-license 
firm intangible assets by contributing to the high-tax parent’s cost, (2) aggressive 
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contractual terms often in the form of low contract and agreement buy-in payments and 
(3) pure business opportunities available to the MNC. In the context of earnings shifting 
between the MNC and its subsidiaries, TPA often refers to the artificial inflation of 
earnings in lower taxed jurisdictions and related reduction of earnings in higher taxed 
jurisdictions (Desai & Hines, 2002) (Richardson & Taylor, 2015) (Gravelle, 2015) 
(OECD, 2015). The earnings shifted to the lower taxed region result in comparatively 
lower corporate tax liabilities and simultaneously reduce taxable earnings in the higher 
taxed region. Transactions are structured between headquarters and subsidiaries to 
promote corporate tax avoidance. The MNC’s effective corporate tax rate may be 
lowered as a result of lower corporate tax rates in a specific jurisdiction, territorial tax 
rather than worldwide tax as well as other laws and regulations that differ between 
regions. Previous studies identify TPA as extensive non-arm’s length transactions 
between related parties and found that U.S. firms engaged in such activity are more likely 
to utilize a tax haven incorporated firm (Richardson & Taylor, 2015). Such non-arms’ 
length transactions and relationships must be disclosed in the financial statements of the 
firm. The specific disclosure requirements are set by the regulatory body for Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) of financial statements issued within each 
jurisdiction.  
The UK’s Financial Reporting Standard 8 (FRS 8), effective December 1995, 
defines the financial statement disclosures necessary to declare the existence of related 
parties and associated transactions. FRS 8 requires disclosure of related party transactions 
within the financial statements (e.g. purchases or sales of goods, assets or services, 
agency arrangements, leasing arrangements, transfer of R&D, license agreements, 
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provision of finance, etc.). Per FRS 8, “in the absence of information to the contrary […] 
transactions are presumed to have been undertaken on an arm’s length basis, i.e. on terms 
which could have been obtained in a transaction with an external party, in which each 
side bargained knowledgeably and freely, unaffected by any relationship between them” 
(UK Financial Reporting Council, 1995). Therefore, one may refer to such disclosure or 
lack thereof to determine whether related party transactions were conducted arm’s length. 
UK companies listed in a European Union or European Economic Area securities 
market follow International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for consolidated 
financial statements since 2005 (Deloitte Global Services Limited, 2015). IFRS 
International Accounting Standard 24 (IAS 24) requires similar related party disclosure 
since 1986 (Deloitte Global Services Limited, 2015). IAS 24 also requires a statement 
that such transactions were made arm’s length only if such disclosure can be 
substantiated.  
If the MNC’s home-country were to transition from a worldwide tax system to a 
territorial tax system, differences in corporate tax rates, tax laws and regulations would 
likely still exist. Such variation between regions facilitate corporate tax avoidance 
methods utilizing transfer pricing. Thus, despite a transition from a worldwide tax system 
to a territorial tax system, TPA will likely continue to promote tax haven utilization. 
2.2.4.3. Thin Capitalization 
Thin capitalization refers to another form of transfer pricing whereby the arm’s 
length principle previously discussed is applied to the external financing activities of 
firms. Highly leveraged firms utilize a debt allocation strategy that effectively serves as 
another corporate tax avoidance method to shift taxable earnings from a high-tax 
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jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction. In the case of thin capitalization, taxable earnings 
are impacted by the structure and source location of company debt and the related 
interest. The ability to deduct interest expense on debt results in a reduction in taxable 
earnings for the corporation. The MNC is able to take advantage of its access to varied 
tax systems, corporate tax rates and tax regulations by strategically allocating its debt. A 
MNC with access to a low-tax jurisdiction might source its home-country intracompany 
debt from the low-tax jurisdiction (Richardson & Taylor, 2015).  
The OECD provided example scenarios whereby the level of debt is expected to 
have an impact on the taxable profit of multinational firms (OECD, 2012) (OECD, 2015). 
The OECD’s thin capitalization examples are utilized, expanded upon and presented in 
Figure 1. The scenario begins with a U.S. parent company establishing a subsidiary in a 
foreign country. As a result of the debt and equity combination (i.e. 50% debt and 50% 
equity) used to establish the subsidiary, deductible interest expense paid by the subsidiary 
to the parent results in a lower tax liability as compared to 100% equity financing. The 
second subsidiary is established with a greater amount of debt sourced from the parent 
company (i.e. 90% debt and 10% equity) resulting in greater tax savings. Any 
withholding tax on related interest payments in the foreign jurisdiction reduce the 
realized tax savings. As such, tax-haven jurisdictions may be utilized in establishing 
additional subsidiaries as shown with the third subsidiary. The third subsidiary is 
established using intercompany loans from the second subsidiary. This allows the firm to 
utilize foreign earnings in intercompany debt while paying little to no tax in the tax-haven 
jurisdiction. The U.S. parent may also fund projects with intercompany debt sourced 
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from the lower-tax jurisdictions. This creates deductible interest expense in the high-tax 
country while utilizing earnings from lower tax foreign jurisdictions.  
In examining a small (4) sample of inverted firms, (Seida & Wempe, 2004) found 
that U.S. intercompany debt and related interest expense increased dramatically post-
corporate inversion. This allows the MNC to deduct related interest expense from taxable 
earnings at the high-tax home-country level. In addition, the post-inversion parent may 
finance its ownership of the pre-inversion parent largely with debt resulting in tax 
deductible interest expense and untaxed or lightly taxed interest income (Desai & Hines, 
2002).  
Worldwide tax systems do impose limits to the amount of deductible interest 
expense. These limitations are often in the form of earnings stripping rules, transfer 
pricing rules and thin capitalization rules. However, as previously discussed, the MNC is 
able to defer (often permanently) repatriating its foreign earnings back to the home-
country. Thus, foreign subsidiary operations and intercompany lending utilize 
unrepatriated foreign earnings. As a result, foreign sourced debt effectively comes at no 
additional cost. The resulting earnings from intracompany debt are held in the low-tax 
jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the MNCs home-country financing needs are satisfied and its 
effective tax rate is reduced.  
In the UK, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) follows the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) transfer pricing 
approach (OECD, 2012) and defines in tax terms a thinly capitalized firm as one that “has 
more debt than it either could or would borrow acting purely in its own interests, leading 
to the possibility of excessive interest deductions (i.e. a greater amount than would arise 
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if the borrower was acting at arm’s length from the lender or guarantor). The company is 
only able to carry excessive borrowing because it is either borrowing from connected 
companies or borrowing from third parties on the strength of group support in the form of 
guarantees” (HRMC, 2016). HRMC may disallow the deductibility of interest paid 
between related parties for several reasons including excessive interest rates, excessive 
loan amounts and excessive company leverage. While each unique case of potential 
excessive interest is reviewed separately by HRMC using the arm’s length principle, a 
debt-to-equity ratio of 1:1 and interest cover (i.e. Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
divided by Interest Expense) of 3:1 is generally and informally considered acceptable 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014). 
The tax benefits of such debt allocation strategies are primarily made possible by 
differences in corporate tax rates between taxing jurisdictions. As with TPA methods, 
differences in corporate tax rates, as well as tax laws and regulations, would likely still 
exist even if the MNC’s home-country were to transition from a worldwide tax system to 
a territorial tax system. Such variation between regions facilitate corporate tax avoidance 
methods utilizing thin capitalization or debt allocation strategies. Thus, despite a 
transition from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system, thin capitalization will 
likely continue to promote tax haven utilization. 
2.2.4.4. Intangible Assets 
Intangible assets are non-monetary and non-physical in nature such as intellectual 
property in the form of licensing agreements, patents, trademarks, and copyrights as well 
as goodwill and research and development (Deloitte Global Services Limited, 2015). 
MNCs realize a tax benefit from transactions (e.g. transfers and related cost sharing 
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agreements) with related parties involving intangible assets when the related expense 
reduces taxable earnings in the high-tax jurisdiction and earnings are transferred to the 
lower-tax jurisdiction. To the extent that the price of the transaction exceeds the price that 
would be charged to an unrelated party, excessive earnings are realized in the low-tax 
jurisdiction and excessive expenses reduce taxable earnings in the high-tax jurisdiction.  
As with other regulations regarding the valuation of transactions involving related 
parties, intangible asset transfers are analyzed by regulatory bodies using an arm’s length 
perspective. That is, whether the transaction’s structure (e.g. terms including price) is 
equivalent to that of a similar transaction with an unrelated party. MNCs are once again 
able to utilize access to varied corporate tax rates, tax systems and tax regulations to 
strategically structure intangible asset transactions. However, an additional layer of 
complexity exists in determining whether intangible asset transactions are arm’s length 
due to the inherent difficulty in measuring the value of such assets (Richardson & Taylor, 
2015) (Gravelle, 2015). The value of a trademark, for instance, is inherently difficult to 
determine in part due to the subjectivity in estimating the earning potential of the asset. 
Intangible assets are recognized in the financial statements of UK MNCs through the 
UK’s Financial Reporting Standard 10 and International Accounting Standard 38.  
A common corporate structure used to conduct corporate tax avoidance that 
involves both the pricing of contractual agreements and intangible assets is the “Double 
Irish Dutch Sandwich”. Richardson (2011) describes Google Inc.’s use of such a 
corporate structure and search engine intellectual property to lower its tax liabilities 
associated with search engine revenues. Figure 2 displays this general organizational 
structure and process and Figure 3 displays the specific arrangement of Google as 
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described by Richardson (2011). In general, a U.S. based parent corporation licenses 
intellectual property to a holding company that is located and incorporated in Ireland, but 
as a result of management location has a tax-haven tax jurisdiction (e.g. Bermuda). The 
Ireland holding company then sub-licenses the intellectual property to another holding 
company located in the Netherlands. The holding company in the Netherlands then sub-
licenses the intellectual property to an operating company located in Ireland. Richardson 
(2011) notes that “Google BV (i.e. Netherlands) exists because royalties paid directly 
from an Irish Company to a Bermuda company would be subject to an Irish withholding 
tax”. Revenue from the utilization of the intellectual property is first recorded in the 
Ireland holding company. However, Irish taxable earnings are typically low due to 
combination of deductible royalty payments paid to the Dutch holding company and the 
lack of Irish withholding tax on royalty payments. The Dutch holding company then 
makes a similar royalty payment to the Bermuda holding company whereby the royalties 
paid offset the royalties received. While royalties are paid to the U.S. parent, most 
earnings are reinvested in the tax haven jurisdiction. As it relates to transfer pricing, one 
may question whether the terms of the agreements between these entities are at arm’s-
length. As it relates to intangible assets, such assets allow the firm to engage in such 
strategic arrangements and lower tax liabilities. 
Once again, the tax benefits of such corporate tax avoidance strategies are 
primarily made possible by differences in corporate tax rates between taxing 
jurisdictions. Differences in corporate tax rates, as well as tax laws and regulations, 
would likely still exist even if the MNC’s home-country were to transition from a 
worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. Such variation between regions facilitate 
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corporate tax avoidance methods utilizing intangible assets. Thus, despite a transition 
from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system, intangible assets will likely 
continue to promote tax haven utilization. 
2.3. Research Questions 
It has been argued by researchers, executives and media outlets that corporate 
entities are disadvantaged by a worldwide tax system and the U.S. corporate tax rate. 
Such disadvantages are used to explain the corporate tax avoidance behavior of firms. 
That is, corporate entities are utilizing corporate tax avoidance strategies such as tax-
havens and earning shifting only because they must do so to overcome the burdens 
imposed by a worldwide tax system and comparatively high corporate tax rate and 
effectively compete in a global market. One solution often proposed is a transition from a 
worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system.   
However, the review of incentives to shift earnings described above has led to the 
expectation that Multinationality, Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness, Thin Capitalization 
and Intangible Assets will remain associated with tax haven utilization despite a 
transition to a territorial tax system.  
The United Kingdom transitioned from a worldwide to a territorial tax system in 
2009. As such, we may examine the behavior of UK firms pre- and post-territorial tax 
system. If a transition to a territorial tax system reduces the incentives to utilize tax 
havens, then we would expect to find a corresponding reduction in the significance of 
such incentives in explaining tax haven utilization. A case study approach is utilized to 
examine the behavior of selected firms in multiple industries. 
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2.4. A Case Study Approach to Analyze the Impact of a Transition to a Territorial 
Tax System 
2.4.1. Method and Case Selection 
As previously discussed, the current literature does not evaluate the firm level 
impacts related to a transition from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. 
The case study approach is employed in the remaining sections of this chapter to evaluate 
firm behavior and characteristics pre- and post-transition to a territorial tax system over 
the UK Corporate Tax Reform period (i.e. 2009 to 2015 or CTR period). Case studies are 
focused on the firm characteristics previously described to determine whether firm 
behavior changed post-transition to a territorial tax system. Case studies will explore 
whether firms reduced, maintained or expanded the use of tax havens for subsidiary 
location. Tax haven utilization is measured as the number (and percentage) of firm 
subsidiaries incorporated in an OECD tax haven. Therefore, one must identify UK MNC 
subsidiaries located in tax havens in order to analyze such behavior. Tax haven utilization 
is addressed initially by evaluating a larger group of firms than studied in case analysis, 
which also assists in firm selection. 
2.4.2. Firm-Specific Review of Historical Tax Haven Utilization: The Data 
The UK Companies Act of 1985, Section 231, Schedule 5 (CA 1985) required 
companies to disclose the name and place of incorporation of “principal” subsidiaries 
(e.g. as determined by impact to profit or loss or proportion of company assets) in the 
notes to the financial statements (UK National Archives, 1985). Since 1985, several 
revisions have superseded earlier legislation and increased the disclosure requirements of 
firms. The UK Companies Act of 2006, Section 410 (CA 2006) required companies to 
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disclose their “principal” subsidiaries and other significant holdings within the notes to 
the financial statements and submit a complete list to Companies House with the annual 
return (UK National Archives, 2006) (Deloitte Publications, 2015). Companies House is 
an UK executive agency that “incorporates and dissolves limited companies, registers the 
information companies are legally required to supply, and makes that information 
available to the public” (UK Companies House, 2015). CA 2006 applied to companies 
preparing financial statements under both IFRS and UK GAAP. CA 2006 was updated to 
require a full list of all subsidiaries within the financial statements as of July 1, 2015 and 
the address of the registered office of each subsidiary rather than the country of 
incorporation as of January 1, 2016.  
Complete historical listings of firm subsidiaries are not widely available. Given 
the disclosure requirements of UK firms, one could reasonably expect to utilize UK 
firm’s publicly available subsidiary listings through Companies House as well as 
appendices and notes to the financial statements to identify subsidiaries located in tax 
havens. However, upon examination of firm disclosures via Companies House as well as 
financial statements and related notes (i.e. prior to 2016), few companies were found to 
have consistently reported such information. A report by an international non-
governmental charity group ActionAid, which focuses on issues that impact global 
poverty, supports this finding. In 2011, ActionAid reviewed the subsidiary disclosures of 
the FTSE100 and found that more than half of the listed companies were not in 
compliance with the disclosure requirements listed above (ActionAid, 2011). ActionAid 
took additional steps including requesting additional information from FTSE100 firms, 
submitting formal complaints to government agencies and working with an information 
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and data gathering firm (i.e. DueDil) to construct a list of subsidiaries for FTSE100 firms 
as of 2011. In July 2011, FTSE100 firms were found to have as many as 2,600 
subsidiaries with as many as 62% located in tax havens (ActionAid, 2011). ActionAid’s 
2011 subsidiary listing was made publicly available which assisted with the construction 
of a sample of firms for case study. 
As previously mentioned and discussed in further detail below, the UK began the 
transition to a territorial tax system in 2009. The measure of tax havens used for case 
studies is defined by the percentage of subsidiary firms incorporated in an OECD tax 
haven as listed on Table I. Thus, in order to compare tax haven utilization pre-territorial 
tax system (i.e. pre-July 2009) to post-territorial tax system, a list of firms was 
constructed that disclose a complete subsidiary listing both pre- and post-territorial tax 
system. ActionAid’s July 2011 FTSE100 firm listing and subsidiary data is compared to a 
pre-territorial tax system observation (i.e. subsidiary data pre-July 2009 depending on 
each firm’s fiscal year end and data availability) and a post-territorial tax system (i.e. 
subsidiary data near the completion of the UK’s transition plan ending April 2015). 
FTSE100 firm financial statements, related notes to financial statements and Companies 
House information was reviewed for firms in numerous sectors (engineering, food and 
drink, household products, insurance, investment and finance, manufacturing, media, 
mining, oil and gas, pharmaceutical and chemical, real estate, retail, software, support 
services, utilities, and wireless communication services) to verify existing disclosure. Of 
the firms that properly disclosed, two firms were chosen in five industries (i.e. 
engineering, food and drink, pharmaceutical and chemical, retail and utilities). FTSE100 
firm financial statements and Companies House information was reviewed in detail for 
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selected firms in order to determine both the number of subsidiaries and the percentage in 
OECD listed tax-havens. Table 2 lists the number of tax haven and total subsidiaries, as 
well as the percentage of subsidiaries in tax havens, for all ten firms at each of the three 
observation points. Table 2 also includes the percentage change and average subsidiaries 
over all three observations points. Figure 11 graphs the percentage of tax haven 
subsidiaries for all selected firms at all three observation points. Table 3 lists the location 
of tax haven subsidiaries in 2011 for all selected firms.  
2.4.3. Firm Characteristics and Incentives to Utilize Corporate Tax Avoidance: 
The Data 
Case studies will also explore certain firm characteristics and incentives to utilize 
corporate tax avoidance methods (e.g. Multinationality, Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness, 
Intangible Assets and Thin Capitalization), many of which have previously been found to 
be correlated with tax haven utilization (Richardson & Taylor, 2015).  Financial 
statement data is accessed through DataStream and published annual reports. 
Multinationality is measured as the foreign percentage of total revenue. Transfer pricing 
aggressiveness is evaluated through any indication in financial statements that related 
party transactions cannot be substantiated as arm’s length. The extent to which firms are 
thinly capitalized is evaluated through the debt to equity ratio and interest cover ratio. 
Intangible assets is evaluated as the percentage of total assets. Table 4 lists descriptive 
data for all selected firms over the UK Corporate Tax Reform period (i.e. all averages are 
calculated using data one year prior and one year beyond the formal corporate tax reform 
period of 2010 – 2014). As each case is reviewed, one must also consider the key 
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regulatory reforms enacted as part of the transition to a territorial tax system and the 
related impact on firm behavior.  
2.4.4. United Kingdom Strategic Plan for Corporate Tax Reform  
There are many distinctions between a worldwide and territorial tax system. As 
such, the United Kingdom’s transition to a territorial tax system is multifaceted and 
delineated in a five-year (2010 to 2014) strategic plan (HM Treasury, 2010) (UK 
National Archives, 2010). In addition, prior to the development of the formal strategic 
plan (i.e. Corporate Tax Reform or CTR Plan), the UK government made certain changes 
at the outset of the UK transition in 2009. The timeline for the CTR Plan is shown on 
Figure 4. The UK government’s focus throughout the CTR plan is “creating the most 
competitive tax regime in the G20 […] to make it more attractive to international 
business (UKTI, 2013).” Key areas of reform in the CTR plan include: a phased 
reduction in the corporate tax rate; reform of Controlled Foreign Company rules; 
reformed taxation of foreign branches; and reformed taxation of innovation and 
intellectual property (HM Treasury, 2010) (UK National Archives, 2010).  
The phased reduction in the corporate tax rate established rates effective in April 
of each year between 2011 and 2015. The UK corporate tax rate fell from 30% to 28% in 
2009, 26% in 2011, 24% in 2012, 23% in 2013, 21% in 2014 and 20% in 2015 (KPMG, 
2016). As for undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries, updated Controlled Foreign 
Company rules exempt foreign earnings of UK-controlled firms as of January 2013 
(UKTI, 2013). If foreign earnings truly represent domestic earnings (e.g. UK earnings 
shifted to a foreign location), then the foreign earnings do not qualify for exemption. 
Further, in order to encourage innovation in the UK, the CTR plan includes a reduced tax 
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rate on profits (e.g. profits from royalties, sales of patents, and sales of related products) 
from inventions patented in the UK (UKTI, 2013). The “patent box” rules reduce the 
corporate tax rate to 10% on qualifying patent-related profits from April 2013 (i.e. on 
patents commercialized after November 29, 2010) (HM Treasury, 2010) (UK National 
Archives, 2010). The CTR plan also allows certain tax credits for research and 
development to be taken “above the line” from 2013. The new R&D rules enhance the 
overall value of R&D allowances in order to further promote such activity in the UK.  
In addition, one key element of the UK’s transition was implemented prior to the 
formal CTR plan. Multinationals often repatriate foreign subsidiary earnings to the 
domestic parent through corporate dividends. Given the importance of repatriated 
earnings (and alternatively, reinvested foreign earnings), one of the primary distinctions 
in tax systems lies in the methods of taxing a multinational’s dividend income received 
from foreign subsidiaries. The United Kingdom’s method of taxing dividends received 
from foreign subsidiaries was very similar to the United States until 2009. Repatriated 
earnings were taxed at the corporate rate after accounting for a complex set of foreign tax 
credits and exclusions. As part of the effort to combat a swarm of UK corporate 
inversions and become a territorial tax system, the UK government took swift action to 
reduce the tax burden associated with repatriated earnings. Repatriated foreign earnings 
in the form of dividends became largely tax exempt in July 2009 (HM Treasury, 2010) 
(UK National Archives, 2010) (Devereux & Loretz, 2011) (UKTI, 2013).  Similar 
exemptions were provided for foreign branches (i.e. foreign trade without a formal 
separate foreign subsidiary) through the firm’s ability to elect branch exemption to UK 
corporate tax as of July 2011. 
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2.4.5. Results of Case Studies by Sector   
2.4.5.1. Engineering Sector (BAE Systems and GKN) 
Business and Geographic Markets 
BAE Systems Public Limited Company (PLC) is a UK incorporated (est. 1977) 
“global defense, aerospace and security company providing products for air, land and 
naval forces including advanced electronics, security, information technology solutions 
and support services” (MarketLine, 2016). BAE’s primary markets include the United 
States (36% of 2015 Sales), United Kingdom (23%), Saudi Arabia (21%) and Australia 
(3%). The remaining sales are categorized in “other” regions. BAE reported an average 
of £17,849 million in sales and £20,813 million in assets over the period of the UK 
Corporate Tax Reform plan (i.e. CTR period). BAE is headquartered in London, UK and 
listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
GKN PLC is a UK incorporated (est. 2001) “global engineering company serving 
the automotive, aerospace, agricultural, construction, mining and other industrial 
markets” (MarketLine, 2016). GKN’s primary markets include the United States (38.22% 
of 2015 Sales), Europe (non-UK; 35.21%), Asia Pacific (14.11%), United Kingdom 
(12.43%), and Africa (.03%). GKN Reported an average of £6,522 million in sales and 
£5,481 million in assets over the CTR period. GKN is headquartered in Worcestershire, 
UK and listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Tax Haven Utilization 
Of BAE’s 456 subsidiaries in January 2008, 18 or 3.95% were located in OECD 
tax haven jurisdictions. By July 2011, BAE’s subsidiaries in tax havens had increased 
slightly to 4.13% (21 of 509). By January 2015 BAE reported 6.42% (24 of 374) 
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subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens. Therefore, over the CTR period, BAE 
experienced a 33% increase in the number of subsidiaries or 2.47% increase in the 
percent of total subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens.  
Of GKN’s 232 subsidiaries in May 2009, 5 or 2.2% were located in OECD tax 
haven jurisdictions. GKN’s tax haven subsidiaries remained constant by July 2011 (5 of 
221 or 2.26%) and February 2014 (5 of 236 or 2.12%). However, by February 2016 GKN 
reported 24 or 9.49% (24 of 253) subsidiaries located in tax haven jurisdictions. The 
substantial increase is primarily due to the October 2015 acquisition of the Dutch 
aerospace company Fokker Technologies Group. Therefore, over the CTR period, GKN 
experienced a 380% increase in the number of subsidiaries or 7.33% increase in the 
percent of total subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens primarily due to an acquisition. 
Multinationality 
As previously mentioned, the degree of foreign operations as compared to 
domestic operations has been found to encourage MNCs to participate in earnings 
shifting. Multinationality is measured as the foreign percentage of total revenue. Foreign 
sales are analyzed as the percentage of total sales unless noted otherwise. Over the CTR 
Period, BAE reported an average of 79.32% foreign sales (i.e. percent of total sales). 
Overall, BAE reported a slight decrease (0.49%) in the percentage of foreign sales 
(77.78% in 2007 and 77.29% in 2015) which varied by less than 5% annually over the 
CTR period. 
GKN reported an average of 85.92% foreign sales over the CTR period. Foreign 
sales were 54% of total sales in 2007 and 2008 and subsequently increased to 82% in 
2009. Foreign sales trended upward for the remaining CTR period. Overall, GKN 
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reported an increase of 34% in the percentage of foreign sales (54% in 2007 and 88% in 
2015).  
Thin Capitalization 
As previously stated, a debt-to-equity ratio of 1:1 and interest cover of 3:1 (EBIT 
divided by Interest Expense on Debt) is generally and informally considered acceptable 
by UK HMRC. Therefore, UK MNCs are considered thinly capitalized when the debt-to-
equity ratio exceeds 1:1 and the interest cover ratio is less than 3:1. BAE’s debt-to-equity 
ratio per annual financial statement data exceeded 1:1 over the entire CTR period. While 
the firm is highly leveraged given the debt-to-equity, BAE’s interest cover ratio was less 
than 3:1 in only one year during the CTR period (i.e. 2009). As such, BAE is not 
considered thinly capitalized. The debt-to-equity and interest cover ratio varied 
considerably over the CTR period with an average of 4.94 and 6.33, respectively, but did 
not demonstrate a consistent upward or downward trend in thin capitalization. 
GKN’s debt-to-equity ratio per annual financial statement data also exceeded 1:1 
over the entire CTR period. However, GKN’s interest cover ratio was less than 3:1 only 
in the two years where the firm experienced losses (e.g. negative EBIT in 2008 and 
2009). As such, GKN is not considered thinly capitalized. The debt-to-equity and interest 
cover ratio varied considerably over the CTR period with an average of 2.41 and 5.18, 
respectively, but did not demonstrate a consistent upward or downward trend in thin 
capitalization. 
Intangible Assets 
Intangible assets and all changes in intangibles are analyzed as a percentage of 
total assets unless noted otherwise. BAE’s intangible assets represent an average of 51% 
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of total assets over the CTR period. Overall, BAE’s intangible assets increased £558 
million (i.e. an increase of 4.43% in the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. 
While intangibles as a percentage of total assets remained relatively constant over the 
CTR period (i.e. varied less than 4% annually), total intangibles varied by as much as 
£2,747 million annually. Thus, BAE’s reported intangible assets do not demonstrate a 
consistent trend over the CTR period.  
GKN’s intangible assets represent an average of 22% of total assets over the CTR 
period. Overall, GKN’s intangible assets increased £1,440 million (i.e. an increase of 
14% in the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. Intangibles as a percentage of 
total assets as well as total intangibles remained relatively constant (i.e. annual variation 
of less than 2%) over the CTR period with the exception of three years (i.e. 2011, 2012 
and 2015 with increases of £408, £582 and £414 million respectively). Primarily as a 
result of these three years, GKN’s intangibles demonstrate an upward trend. 
Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
In order to measure transfer pricing aggressiveness, related party disclosures were 
reviewed in the annual financial statements over the CTR period for both BAE and GKN. 
There were no related party transactions identified where a lack of disclosure gave rise to 
questions or concerns regarding the arm’s length basis of such transactions.  
Engineering Sector Summary 
While the UK Corporate Tax Reform plan was not specifically designed to 
prevent the utilization of tax havens, key areas of reform were focused on creating a more 
competitive tax regime (e.g. lower tax rates, eliminating certain forms of tax on foreign 
earnings, etc.). UK leaders were primarily concerned with keeping firms incorporated in 
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the UK. Unfortunately, tax havens are extremely competitive from the standpoint of tax 
rates and other tax regulation. While the newly reformed UK territorial tax system may 
be more competitive than pre-CTR, intuitively it does not diminish the attractiveness of 
tax havens. As previously discussed, the literature supports the notion that firms will seek 
to pay the lowest tax. In this effort, tax havens may be used to conduct the corporate tax 
avoidance methods previously discussed (e.g. earnings shifting) in both worldwide and 
territorial tax systems.  
Both BAE and GKN increased the percentage of total subsidiaries located in tax 
haven jurisdictions. Neither firm dramatically increased tax haven utilization, 2.47% for 
BAE and 7.33% for GKN, but these findings do not support the notion that a territorial 
tax system leads to less utilization of tax havens. Furthermore, and discussed below, both 
firm’s incentives to utilize tax havens remained steady or increased over the CTR period.  
Multinationality as measured by foreign sales remained stable for BAE and 
increased steadily for GKN. Both firms reported a significant amount of foreign sales 
with an average of 83% over the CTR period. Thin capitalization as measured by the 
debt-to-equity ratio and interest cover ratio do not lead to any conclusive findings. Both 
firms are highly leveraged, but neither were thinly capitalized over any significant 
portion of the CTR period. Both firms reported an increase in intangible assets over the 
CTR period. BAE reported a higher percentage of intangible assets over the CTR period 
(i.e. BAE’s average of 51% versus GKN’s average of 22%), but remained relatively 
stable. GKN’s total intangible assets demonstrated an upward trend over the CTR period.  
Based upon the review of BAE and GKN, UK firms in the engineering sector are 
increasing their use of tax havens and are equally or more likely to utilize tax havens as 
	 36 
demonstrated by measures of multinationality and intangible assets. In addition, as 
previously discussed, increased multinationality and intangible assets increase the 
likelihood that firms will utilize corporate tax avoidance methods to lower their tax 
liabilities.  
2.4.5.2. Pharmaceutical Sector (AstraZeneca and GlaxoSmithKline) 
Business and Geographic Markets 
Through a merger of Sweden-based Astra and UK-based Zeneca, AstraZeneca 
PLC is a UK incorporated (est. 1992) “global biopharmaceutical company engaged in 
developing, manufacturing and marketing prescription pharmaceuticals in several 
therapeutic areas” (MarketLine, 2016). AZN’s primary markets include the Americas 
(US, Canada and other at 36% of 2015 sales pre-intra-group eliminations), Europe (25%), 
UK (22%), China (7%) and Japan (5%). AZN reported an average of £18,396 million in 
sales and £34,811 million in assets over the CTR period. AZN is headquartered in 
London, UK and listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Through a merger of Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham, 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC is a UK incorporated (est. 1999) “global healthcare company 
specialized in the discovery, development, manufacturing and marketing of 
pharmaceutical, vaccines and consumer health-related products” (MarketLine, 2016). 
GSK’s primary markets include the US (32% of 2014 sales), Europe (28%), Emerging 
Markets (27%), and Japan (7%) with the remaining categorized as “other” regions. GSK 
reported an average of £26,287 million in sales and £40,854 million in assets over the 
CTR period. GSK is headquartered in Brentford, UK and listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. 
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Tax Haven Utilization 
Of AZN’s 283 subsidiaries in May 2009, 13 or 4.59% were located in OECD tax 
haven jurisdictions. By July 2011, AZN’s subsidiaries in tax havens had increased to 
10.20% (26 of 255). By January 2015 AZN reported 10.99% (21 of 191) subsidiaries 
located in OECD tax havens. Therefore, over the CTR period, AZN experienced a 
61.54% increase in the number of subsidiaries or 6.40% increase in the percent of total 
subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens. 
Of GSK’s 390 subsidiaries in October 2008, 50 or 12.82% were located in OECD 
tax haven jurisdictions. By July 2011 and October 2015, 12.62% and 12.91%, 
respectively, of GSK’s subsidiaries (53 of 420 and 59 of 457) were located in OECD tax 
havens. Therefore, over the CTR period, GSK experienced an 18% increase in the 
number of subsidiaries or 0.09% increase in the percent of total subsidiaries located in 
OECD tax havens.  
Multinationality 
Foreign sales are analyzed as the percentage of total sales unless noted otherwise. 
AZN reported an average of 93.45% foreign sales over the CTR period. Overall, the 
percentage of foreign sales varied less than 2% annually. AZN reported a decrease of 
2.11% in the percentage of foreign sales (93.3% in 2007 and 91.19% in 2015) over the 
CTR period. Thus, AZN’s foreign sales do not demonstrate an upward or downward 
trend.  
GSK reported an average of 86.83% foreign sales as well as an increase of 0.70% 
in the percentage of foreign sales over the CTR period. Foreign sales increased from 63% 
in 2008 to 93.5% in 2009. Subsequently, foreign sales decreased to 56% in 2013. While 
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the level of firm reporting of geographical information does not support a detailed 
analysis, GSK made numerous acquisitions during this timeframe which likely impacted 
the structure of sales (i.e. both foreign and domestic). Given such variation, GSK’s 
foreign sales do not demonstrate an upward or downward trend.  
Thin Capitalization 
Both AZN’s and GSK’s debit-to-equity ratio per financial statement data 
exceeded 1:1 over the entire CTR period. In addition, the interest cover ratio was greater 
than 3:1 for the entire CTR period. As such, AZN and GSK are not considered thinly 
capitalized.  
AZN’s debt-to-equity ratio varied by less than 0.6 over the CTR period while the 
interest cover ratio varied considerably. The average debt-to-equity ratio and average 
interest cover ratio over the CTR period is reported at 1.53 and 16.01, respectively per 
financial statement data. Neither ratio demonstrated a consistent upward or downward 
trend in thin capitalization over the CTR period. However, the debt-to-equity ratio began 
trending upward in 2013. 
GSK’s debt-to-equity ratio and interest cover ratio varied considerably. The 
average debt-to-equity ratio and average interest cover ratio over the CTR period is 
reported at 4.21 and 10.99, respectively per financial statement data. Neither ratio 
demonstrated a consistent upward or downward trend in thin capitalization over the CTR 
period.  
Intangible Assets 
Intangible assets and all changes in intangibles are analyzed as a percentage of 
total assets unless noted otherwise. AZN’s intangible assets represent an average of 48% 
	 39 
of total assets over the CTR period. Overall, AZN’s intangible assets increased £12,640 
million (i.e. an increase of 13% in the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. 
While AZN reported a decline in intangibles in three years during the CTR period (i.e. 
2009, 2011 and 2013), intangibles as a percentage of total assets as well as total 
intangibles demonstrate an upward trend. 
GSK’s intangible assets represent an average of 34% of total assets over the CTR 
period. Overall, GSK’s intangible assets increased £16,008 million (i.e. an increase of 
23% in the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. Overall, intangibles 
demonstrate an upward trend most notably with the 11.5% increase in 2015.  
Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
In order to measure transfer pricing aggressiveness, related party disclosures were 
reviewed in the annual financial statements over the CTR period for both AZN and GSK. 
There were no related party transactions identified where a lack of disclosure gave rise to 
questions or concerns regarding the arm’s length basis of such transactions. However, 
GSK did not provide specific disclosure stating that related party transactions were 
conducted at arm’s length. Thus, in order to be conservative, one may assume that related 
party transactions were not at arm’s length.  
Pharmaceutical Sector Summary 
Both AZN and GSK increased the percentage of total subsidiaries located in tax 
haven jurisdictions. AZN reported the most dramatic change (from 4.59% to 10.99%) 
while GSK increased by less than 1%. Once again, such findings do not support the 
notion that a territorial tax system leads to less utilization of tax havens. Similarly, both 
firm’s incentives to utilize tax havens remained steady or increased over the CTR period.  
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Multinationality as measured by foreign sales did not demonstrate a consistent 
trend for AZN or GSK. Overall, neither firm reported a variance of more than 2.5% over 
the CTR period. Both firms reported a significant amount of foreign sales with an 
average of 94% for AZN and 87% for GSK over the CTR period. Thin capitalization as 
measured by the debt-to-equity ratio and interest cover ratio do not lead to any conclusive 
findings. Both firms are highly leveraged, but neither were thinly capitalized. Both firms 
reported an increase in intangible assets over the CTR period as well as an upward trend 
in intangibles.  
Based upon the review of AZN and GSK, UK firms in the pharmaceutical sector 
are increasing their use of tax havens and are equally or more likely to utilize tax havens 
as demonstrated by measures of multinationality and intangible assets.  
2.4.5.3. Food and Drink Sector (Diageo and SABMiller) 
Business and Geographic Markets 
SABMiller PLC is a UK incorporated (est. 1895) global firm “engaged in the 
production and distribution of beer and soft drinks” (MarketLine, 2016). SAB’s primary 
markets include South Africa (20% of 2015 sales), Colombia (16%), Australia (11%), 
UK (2%), US (0.6%) with the remaining categorized in “other” regions. SAB reported an 
average of £13,081 million in sales and £29,238 million in assets over the CTR period. 
SAB is headquartered in London, UK and listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Diageo PLC, formed through a merger of Grand Metropolitan PLC and Guinness 
PLC, is a UK incorporated (est. 1997) “global manufacturer and distributor of premium 
spirits, beer and wine products” (MarketLine, 2016). DGE’s primary markets include the 
United States (22.5% of 2015 sales), India (15%), Great Britain (11%), Netherlands 
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(0.3%), with the remaining categorized in “other” regions. DGE reported an average of 
£12,214 million in sales and £21,543 million in assets over the CTR period. DGE is 
headquartered in London, UK and listed on the London Stock Exchange.  
Tax Haven Utilization 
Of SAB’s 375 subsidiaries in March 2010, 100 or 26.67% were located in OECD 
tax haven jurisdictions. By July 2011, SAB’s subsidiaries in tax havens remained 
constant while total subsidiaries decreased to 367. By March 2014 SAB reported 21% (88 
of 419) subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens. Therefore, over the CTR period, SAB 
experienced a 12% decrease in the number of subsidiaries or 5.66% decrease in the 
percent of total subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens.  
Of DGE’s 538 subsidiaries in May 2008, 120 or 22.3% were located in OECD tax 
haven jurisdictions. By July 2011, DGE’s subsidiaries in tax havens increased to 29.3% 
(126 of 430). By May 2014, DGE’s subsidiaries in tax havens continued to increase at 
34.94% (145 of 415). Therefore, over the CTR period, DGE experienced a 20.83% 
increase in the number of subsidiaries or 12.63% increase in the percent of total 
subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens. 
Multinationality 
SAB reported an average of 94% foreign sales over the CTR period. Foreign sales 
trended downward from 2007 to 2009 (i.e. 78.5% to 71%), but increased to 98% in 2010 
and have varied 2% or less since. Therefore, SAB reported an increase of 21.5% in the 
percentage of foreign sales and an overall upward trend over the CTR period. 
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DGE reported an average of 82% foreign sales over the CTR period. Foreign sales 
varied less than 2% until the 22% decrease in 2013. Foreign sales recovered over 2014 
and 2015 ending at 76%, which represents a decrease of 9% over the CTR period.  
Thin Capitalization 
SAB’s debt-to-equity ratio per financial statement data averaged 0.92 over the 
CTR period and exceed 1:1 only in 2012 and 2013. The interest cover ratio averaged 
5.93, varied considerably and was also greater than 3:1 for the entire CTR period. Thus, 
SAB is not considered thinly capitalized. Neither ratio demonstrated a consistent trend in 
thin capitalization over the CTR period. 
DGE’s debt-to-equity ratio per financial statement data averaged 2.38 over the 
CTR period. The interest cover ratio averaged 5.82. While the debt to equity ratio 
exceeded 1:1 for the CTR period, the interest cover remained above 3:1. Thus, DGE is 
not considered thinly capitalized. Neither ratio demonstrated a consistent trend in thin 
capitalization over the CTR period.  
Intangible Assets 
SAB’s intangible assets represent an average of 48% of total assets over the CTR 
period. Overall, SAB’s intangible assets increased £5,884 million (i.e. a decrease of 12% 
in the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. Neither intangibles as a percentage 
of total assets nor total intangibles demonstrate a consistent trend over the CTR period.  
DGE’s intangible assets represent an average of 38% of total assets over the CTR 
period. Overall, DGE’s intangible assets increased £6,848 million (i.e. an increase of 
11% in the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. Both intangibles as a 
percentage of total assets and total intangibles trend upward over the CTR period.  
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Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
In order to measure transfer pricing aggressiveness, related party disclosures were 
reviewed in the annual financial statements over the CTR period for both SAB and DGE. 
There were no related party transactions identified where a lack of disclosure gave rise to 
questions or concerns regarding the arm’s length basis of such transactions. However, 
SAB did not provide specific disclosure stating that related party transactions were 
conducted at arm’s length. In addition, DGE did not provide such disclosure in the 2007 
or 2008 annual reports. Thus, in order to be conservative, one may assume that related 
party transactions were not at arm’s length.  
Food and Drink Sector Summary 
Although SAB decreased the percentage of total subsidiaries located in tax havens 
over the CTR period, the firm maintained 21% tax haven subsidiaries. DGE increased the 
percentage of total subsidiaries located in tax havens to 35%. DGE’s notable (21%) 
increase was due to both increasing subsidiaries in tax havens and decreasing subsidiaries 
in non-tax haven jurisdictions over the CTR period. Therefore, while both firms maintain 
a large percentage of subsidiaries in tax havens, a review of SAB and DGE’s tax haven 
utilization presents conflicting results regarding the notion that a territorial tax system 
leads to less utilization of tax havens. A review of both firm’s incentives to utilize tax 
havens leads to similar findings. 
Both SAB and DGE reported a significant percentage of foreign sales or 
“multinationality” (i.e. 94% and 82%). SAB’s foreign sales increased over the CTR 
period and demonstrated an upward trend. However, DGE’s foreign sales decreased 
overall but did not demonstrate a consistent trend. Thin capitalization as measured by the 
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debt-to-equity ratio and interest cover ratio do not lead to any conclusive findings. DGE 
reported greater leverage, but neither were thinly capitalized. Intangible assets also differ 
between the firms. While both firms report an increase in total intangibles, SAB’s 
intangibles decrease as a percentage of total assets and do not demonstrate a consistent 
trend. DGE reported an upward trend in total intangibles and intangibles as a percentage 
of total assets. 
Based upon the review of SAB and DGE, UK firms in the food and drink sector 
maintain a large portion of subsidiaries (21% to 35%) in tax haven jurisdictions. In 
addition, both firms have incentives to utilize tax havens as demonstrated by measures of 
multinationality and intangible assets. However, the trend in such measures cannot be 
estimated given the variation in incentives between these two firms over the CTR period. 
2.4.5.4. Retail Sector (Tesco and J Sainsbury) 
Business and Geographic Markets 
Tesco PLC is incorporated in the UK (est. 1947) and “operates stores that offer 
grocery items, general merchandise and other non-food items such as electrical products, 
health and beauty products, and apparel and jewelry as well as Tesco Bank” (MarketLine, 
2016). TSCO’s primary markets include the UK (68.9% of 2015 sales), Asia (15.8%), 
Europe (13.6%) and Tesco Bank (1.6%). TSCO reported an average of £61,053 million 
in sales and £47,685 million in assets over the CTR period. TSCO is headquartered in 
Hertfordshire, UK and listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
J Sainsbury PLC is incorporated in the UK and “operates supermarkets, 
convenience stores, online grocery, general merchandise as well as subsidiaries and joint 
ventures in financial services, property management, energy and entertainment” 
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(MarketLine, 2016). The UK is SBRY’s only separately reported geographical market. 
SBRY reported an average of £21,900 million in sales and £12,914 million in assets over 
the CTR period. SBRY is headquartered in Holborn, London and listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. 
Tax Haven Utilization 
Of TSCO’s 412 subsidiaries in July 2008, 59 or 14.32% were located in OECD 
tax haven jurisdictions. By July 2011, TSCO’s subsidiaries in tax havens increased to 
17.39% (100 of 575). By July 2015, TSCO’s subsidiaries in tax havens and non-tax 
havens had decreased resulting in 17.31% in tax havens (54 of 312). Thus, over the CTR 
period, TSCO experienced an 8.47% decrease in the number of subsidiaries or 3% 
increase in the percent of total subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens.  
Of SBRY’s 86 subsidiaries in July 2008, 14 or 16.28% were located in OECD tax 
haven jurisdictions. By July 2011, SBRY’s subsidiaries in tax havens decreased to 
13.48% (12 of 89). By July 2015, SBRY’s subsidiaries in tax havens had increased to 
17.07% (14 of 82). Thus, SBRY experienced no change in the number of subsidiaries and 
a 0.8% increase in the percent of total subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens over the 
CTR period.  
Multinationality 
TSCO reported an average of 32% foreign sales over the CTR period. Foreign 
sales trended upward from 2007 to 2012 (i.e. 23% to 33%), but trended downward after 
2012. Overall, foreign sales varied less than 3.5% annually resulting in a 6% increase in 
the percentage of foreign sales over the CTR period. SBRY reported no foreign sales 
over the CTR period.  
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Thin Capitalization 
TSCO’s debt-to-equity ratio averaged 2.56 and the interest cover ratio averaged 
6.04 over the CTR period. The debt-to-equity ratio exceed 1:1 and the interest coverage 
ratio exceeded 3:1 over the entire CTR period. Thus, TSCO is not considered thinly 
capitalized. Neither ratio demonstrated a consistent trend in thin capitalization over the 
CTR period. 
SBRY’s debt-to-equity ratio averaged 1.39 and the interest cover ratio averaged 
5.71 over the CTR period. The debt-to-equity ratio exceeded 1:1 over the CTR period. 
However, the interest cover ratio exceeded 3:1 until 2015. Thus, the firm was not 
considered thinly capitalized until 2015. While the debt-to-equity ratio trended upward 
since 2012, the interest cover ratio varied less than 0.8 over the same period until falling 
to 0.35 in 2015. The significant decrease (7.39) in the interest cover ratio in 2015 is a 
result of a significant decrease in earnings (i.e. rather than a significant change in interest 
expense).  
Intangible Assets 
TSCO’s intangible assets represent an average of 8.7% of total assets over the 
CTR period. Overall, TSCO’s intangible assets increased £1,726 million (i.e. an increase 
of 0.38% in the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. TSCO’s total intangible 
assets trended upward until 2013 at which point intangibles began a downward trend. 
Intangible assets as a percentage of total assets varied less than 1.2% over the CTR 
period.  
SBRY’s intangible assets represent only 1.6% of total assets over the CTR period. 
Overall, SBRY’s intangible assets increased £150 million (i.e. an increase of 0.14% in 
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the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. SBRY’s total intangible assets and 
percentage of total assets trended upward since 2011. However, annual variance over the 
CTR period is small (e.g. less than 0.38% for the percent of total assets).  
Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
In order to measure transfer pricing aggressiveness, related party disclosures were 
reviewed in the annual financial statements over the CTR period for both TSCO and 
SBRY. There were no related party transactions identified where a lack of disclosure 
gave rise to questions or concerns regarding the arm’s length basis of such transactions. 
However, neither firm provided specific disclosure stating that related party transactions 
were conducted at arm’s length. Thus, in order to be conservative, one may assume that 
related party transactions were not at arm’s length. 
Retail Sector Summary 
Both TSCO and SBRY increased the percentage of total subsidiaries located in 
tax haven jurisdictions (i.e. 3% for TESCO and 0.8% for SBRY). However, TSCO 
decreased the number of subsidiaries located in tax havens while SBRY’s remained 
unchanged over the CTR period. Therefore, based upon the percent of total subsidiaries 
located in tax havens for these two firms, the retail sector is expanding the use of tax 
havens. However, a review of the number of subsidiaries located in tax havens leads to 
inconclusive results. In addition, both firm’s incentives to utilize tax havens remained 
steady or increased over the CTR period. 
The retail sector firms are much less multinational from the standpoint of foreign 
sales and intangible assets. TSCO reported only 32% foreign sales and SBRY reported 
none. TSCO’s reported a small (6%) increase in foreign sales with no consistent trend 
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over the CTR period. Thin capitalization as measured by the debt-to-equity ratio and 
interest cover ratio do not lead to any conclusive findings. Both firms are highly 
leveraged, but neither were consistently thinly capitalized or report a trend toward thin 
capitalization. Both firms reported an increase in intangible assets over the CTR period. 
However, neither firm reported a significant amount of intangibles (average of 8.7% total 
assets for TSCO and 1.6% for SBRY).  
Based upon the review of TSCO and SBRY, UK firms in the retail sector are not 
making significant changes to their use of tax havens. Incentives to utilize tax havens are 
lower than other sectors as demonstrated by measures of multinationality and intangible 
assets. There were no significant changes to these measures as well as thin capitalization 
and transfer pricing aggressiveness over the CTR period.  
2.4.5.5. Utilities Sector (BT Group and Severn Trent) 
Business and Geographic Markets 
BT Group PLC is a UK incorporated (est. 2001) “communications services group 
providing fixed-line services, broadband, mobile and television products and services as 
well as networked information technology services” (MarketLine, 2016). BT’s primary 
markets include the UK (77.5% of 2015 sales), Europe, the Middle East and Africa 
(13%), America’s (6.2%) and Asia Pacific (3.3%). BT reported an average of £19,432 
million in sales and £24,788 million in assets over the CTR period. BT is headquartered 
in London, UK and listed on the London Stock Exchange.  
Severn Trent PLC is a UK incorporated (est. 1989) “environmental services 
company involved in the supply of water and the treatment and disposal of sewage” 
(MarketLine, 2016). SVT’s primary markets include the UK (91.6% of 2015 sales) and 
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the US (7.2%) with the remaining categorized in “other” regions. SVT reported an 
average of £1,760 million in sales and £7,770 million in assets over the CTR period. SVT 
is headquartered in London, UK and listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
Tax Haven Utilization 
Of BT’s 665 subsidiaries in March 2009, 135 or 20.30% were located in OECD 
tax haven jurisdictions. By July 2011, BT’s subsidiaries in tax havens were 19.58% (112 
of 572). By March 2015, BT’s subsidiaries in tax havens and non-tax havens had 
decreased resulting in 17.10% in tax havens (66 of 386). Thus, over the CTR period, BT 
experienced a 51% decrease in the number of subsidiaries or 3.2% decrease in the percent 
of total subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens.  
Of SVT’s 107 subsidiaries in January 2008, 7 or 6.54% were located in OECD tax 
haven jurisdictions. By July 2011, SVT’s subsidiaries in tax havens increased to 10% (10 
of 100). By January 2014, SVT’s subsidiaries in tax havens and non-tax havens had 
decreased resulting in 3.37% in tax havens (3 of 89). Thus, over the CTR period, SVT 
experienced a 57% decrease in the number of subsidiaries or 3.2% decrease in the percent 
of total subsidiaries located in OECD tax havens.  
Multinationality 
BT reported an average of 22.7% foreign sales over the CTR period. The 
percentage of foreign sales trended upward during the CTR period resulting in an overall 
increase of 7.8%. SVT reported an average of 13% foreign sales over the CTR period. 
The percentage of foreign sales varied less than 1.7% annually until decreasing 4.5% in 
2015. Overall, SVT’s foreign sales decreased by 4.5%.  
Thin Capitalization 
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BT’s debt-to-equity ratio per financial statement data averaged 11.73 over the 
CTR period. The interest cover ratio averaged 3.82 and fell below 3:1 during 2009 and 
2010. However, the interest cover ratio has trended upward since 2010. BT is highly 
leveraged and the debt-to-equity ratio varied widely over the CTR period. Overall the 
firm is not considered thinly capitalized. 
SVT’s debt-to-equity ratio averaged 7.17 over the CTR period. The interest cover 
ratio averaged 2.11. Thus, SVT is considered thinly capitalized as the debt-to-equity 
exceeded 1:1 and the interest cover ratio fell below 3:1 for the entire CTR period. The 
debt-to-equity ratio trended upward while the interest cover ratio trended downward over 
the CTR period.  
Intangible Assets 
BT’s intangible assets represent an average of 13.5% of total assets over the CTR 
period. Overall, BT’s intangible assets increased by £586 million (i.e. an increase of 1.6% 
in the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. Neither intangibles as a percentage 
of total assets nor total intangibles demonstrate a consistent trend over the CTR period. 
SVT’s intangible assets represent an average of 2% of total assets over the CTR 
period. Overall, SVT’s intangible assets decreased by £69 million (i.e. a decrease of 1.4% 
in the percentage of total assets) over the CTR period. Both intangibles as a percentage of 
total assets and total intangibles trend downward since 2011.  
Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
In order to measure transfer pricing aggressiveness, related party disclosures were 
reviewed in the annual financial statements over the CTR period for both BT and SVT. 
There were no related party transactions identified where a lack of disclosure gave rise to 
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questions or concerns regarding the arm’s length basis of such transactions. However, 
SVT did not provide specific disclosure stating that related party transactions were 
conducted at arm’s length. Thus, in order to be conservative, one may assume that related 
party transactions were not at arm’s length.  
Utilities Sector Summary 
Both BT and SVT decreased the number and percentage of total subsidiaries 
located in tax havens over the CTR period. Both firms reported a notable (51% and 57%) 
decrease in the number of subsidiaries in tax havens. Either measure of tax haven 
utilization supports the notion that a territorial tax system leads to less utilization of tax 
havens. However, a review of the changes in the incentives to utilize tax havens lead to 
inconclusive results for the retail sector. 
BT and SVT report a lower percentage of foreign sales (22.7% and 13%) as 
compared to many of the other sectors reviewed. BT’s foreign sales trended upward 
while SVT’s only notable change was reported in 2015 (4.5% decrease). SVT was thinly 
capitalized during the CTR period, but neither firm’s combined debt-to-equity and 
interest cover ratio demonstrated consistent trends. Intangible assets for the two firms 
also lead to conflicting results as BT’s total intangibles and percentage of total assets 
increased while SVT’s decreased. In addition, SVT’s trended downward while BT’s did 
not demonstrate a consistent trend.   
Based upon the review of BT and SVT, UK firms in the utilities sector are 
decreasing the use of subsidiaries in tax havens. Both firms have some incentives to 
utilize tax havens as demonstrated by measures of multinationality and intangible assets. 
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However, the trend in such measures cannot be estimated given the variation in 
incentives between these two firms over the CTR period. 
2.5. Results 
Results are summarized below for all five sectors and ten firms reviewed in the case 
studies. Results are categorized by each of the firm characteristics and incentives 
previously mentioned including: Tax Haven Utilization, Multinationality, Thin 
Capitalization, Intangible Assets, and Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness. The percentage of 
intangible assets (i.e. Intangible Assets), percentage of foreign sales (i.e. 
Multinationality), percentage of tax haven subsidiaries (i.e. Tax Haven Utilization) and 
debt to equity (i.e. a component of Thin Capitalization) are also presented graphically in 
Figure 11. In addition, Table 2 presents the tax haven and total subsidiaries of each firm. 
Tax Haven Utilization 
Of the ten firms studied in case analysis, six increased or held constant the number of 
subsidiaries located in tax havens. Seven of the ten firms studied increased the percentage 
of total subsidiaries located in tax havens. Two of the three firms that decreased the 
percentage of total subsidiaries located in tax havens were in the utilities sector.  These 
results do not demonstrate that in the event of a transition from a worldwide tax system to 
a territorial tax system, firms will decrease their utilization of tax haven subsidiaries. In 
fact, the majority of firms studied increased the percentage of subsidiaries located in tax 
havens.  
Multinationality 
 Of the ten firms studied in case analysis, half increased the foreign percentage of 
total sales. Three of the four firms that decreased the foreign percentage of total sales 
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reported a decrease of less than five percent. In addition, six firms reported an average of 
79% or greater foreign percentage of total sales over the corporate tax reform period. 
These results do not demonstrate that in the event of a transition from a worldwide tax 
system to a territorial tax system, firms will decrease their multinationality or foreign 
percentage of total sales. In fact, the majority of firms studied maintained a significant 
(i.e. greater than 79%) average foreign percentage of total sales.  
Thin Capitalization 
Overall results from the ten firms studied reveal that each firm’s combined debt-to-
equity and interest cover ratio fail to demonstrate consistent trends. The debt-to-equity 
ratio varied considerably, but generally trended upward for six firms. The debt-to-equity 
did not demonstrate a consistent downward trend for any of the ten firms. The interest 
coverage ratio also varied considerably and generally trended upward for three firms and 
downward for three firms. As such, none were consistently thinly capitalized and none 
reported a trend toward thin capitalization over the corporate tax reform period. These 
results do not demonstrate that in the event of a transition from a worldwide tax system to 
a territorial tax system, firms will decrease their thin capitalization. However, the debt-to-
equity ratio specifically does appear to remain consistent or increase for all but one firm. 
Intangible Assets 
The value of intangible assets increased for nine of the ten firms studied over the 
corporate tax reform period. The percentage of intangible assets increased for eight of the 
firms studied and averaged 38% or above for half of the firms studied. While intangible 
assets varied for the majority of firms over the corporate tax reform period, they 
generally trended upward for six (and downward for two) of the firms studied. These 
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results do not demonstrate that in the event of a transition from a worldwide tax system to 
a territorial tax system, firms will decrease intangible assets. In fact, the majority of firms 
increased intangible assets over the corporate tax reform period. 
Transfer Pricing Aggressiveness 
The review of transfer pricing aggressiveness for the ten firms studied did not reveal 
any consistent trends or changes in transfer pricing aggressiveness over the corporate tax 
reform period. 
2.6. Conclusions 
If multinational corporate entities are disadvantaged by a worldwide tax system (i.e. 
as compared to firms that reside under a territorial tax system), then one may expect firms 
to take advantage of opportunities to mitigate such disadvantages. Corporate tax 
avoidance methods comprise numerous strategies designed to lower the tax liabilities of 
such firms. While lower tax liabilities provide a direct benefit to the firm, they negatively 
impact the government’s ability to collect corporate tax revenue. One possible solution to 
the issue of corporate tax avoidance is to transition worldwide tax systems to territorial 
tax systems. The goal of such a transition is often to reduce or eliminate many of the 
added taxes imposed by worldwide tax systems. Perhaps most important of such added 
taxes is the domestic tax on foreign earnings.  
The review of corporate tax avoidance methods and related firm-level incentives to 
conduct such methods revealed several incentives to utilize tax havens as an instrument 
to conduct corporate tax avoidance. Incentives such as Multinationality, Transfer Pricing 
Aggressiveness, Thin Capitalization and Intangible Assets have been found to be 
associated with tax haven utilization (Richardson & Taylor, 2015). A case study approach 
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has been utilized to examine the behavior of ten firms in five industries within the United 
Kingdom. Since the United Kingdom transitioned to a territorial tax system, the behavior 
of firms within multiple sectors is examined to evaluate whether firms reduce either the 
utilization of tax havens or associated incentives.  
The review of tax haven utilization, multinationality, thin capitalization, intangible 
assets and transfer pricing aggressiveness revealed little evidence to support that firms 
reduce the utilization of tax havens or demonstrate fewer incentives. The majority of 
firms studied increased the percentage of subsidiaries located in tax havens, maintained a 
significant (i.e. greater than 79%) average foreign percentage of total sales (a.k.a. 
multinationality) and increased intangible assets over the corporate tax reform period. In 
addition, firms did not demonstrate a trend of becoming less thinly capitalized or less 
aggressive in transfer pricing.  
The results from the case analysis are intuitive given that tax havens are by design 
more tax advantageous than even non-tax-haven territorial tax systems. As such, despite 
efforts to make tax systems more competitive, tax havens likely prevail in providing 
firms with the superior tax advantages. That is, for example, how could a non-tax-haven 
jurisdiction compete with zero corporate tax rates? The resulting implications are evident; 
governments may risk additional tax revenue by converting to territorial tax systems 
without realizing the desired benefits of firms utilizing fewer tax havens and conducting 
fewer corporate tax avoidance strategies.  
 
3. ESSAY ON CORPORATE INVERSIONS: EARNINGS SHIFTING AND THE 
VALUE IMPLICATIONS OF CASH HOARDS  
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3.1. Overview 
While the inversion process, incentives to invert and impact of corporate 
inversions vary, all corporate inversions represent an attempt to reorganize the corporate 
structure outside the original domestic corporate tax jurisdiction. Corporate inversions 
have taken place since the early 1980s, but the methods used to invert have changed 
dramatically. Regulatory action taken to subdue inversions is largely responsible for such 
change. In order to “invert” the corporate structure whereby the home-country domestic 
parent (foreign subsidiary) becomes the subsidiary (parent), MNCs have utilized multiple 
inversion methods (stock-for-stock transfers, asset transfers, mergers, acquisitions, etc.). 
Regardless of the methods used to invert the corporate structure, the inverted MNC is 
able to take advantage of numerous tax benefits as described below. Post-inversion the 
MNC will also have greater ability to strategically locate its subsidiaries, and arguably its 
earnings, in the most tax-advantageous locations (e.g. territorial tax systems, tax-havens, 
etc.).  
While corporate inversions have been highly debated in the public press, and in 
the extant literature, related costs and benefits have not been fully explored (Babkin, 
Glover, & Levine, 2016). It is also important to note that the implications of corporate 
inversions may be reviewed from several perspectives including the implications for the 
corporate entity, shareholders, and domestic and foreign governments. However, this 
research will focus on the value implications to the firm examined through share value 
with particular focus on firms with permanently reinvested earnings in foreign 
jurisdictions.  
3.2. Literature Review 
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3.2.1. Corporate Inversion Process 
Inversion activity for U.S. MNCs began in the early 1980s. Approximately 92 
corporate inversions have taken place since 1983 (two are still pending, but were 
announced in the same manner as those completed). Inversion activity is generally 
categorized and described in phases; Phase I (1993 to 2002) and Phase II (2006 to 2014). 
As shown on Figure 5, the majority of corporate inversions have taken place within these 
two phases.  
Implementation of various anti-inversion regulation impacted the type and 
substance of the inversions completed within each phase. Phase I inversions were 
primarily paper based transactions and resulted in little movement of real economic 
activity. Phase I inversions were often in the form of stock or asset transfers. While the 
MNC implementing a Phase I inversion became incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction, 
few firms relocated executive management or significant earnings to the foreign 
jurisdiction. In Phase II inversions, MNCs responded to anti-inversion regulations 
requiring economic substance in the foreign jurisdiction in order to avoid tax penalties. 
MNCs began merging and acquiring foreign businesses to increase the economic activity 
within the foreign jurisdiction. Thus, Phase II inversions may be considered a greater 
threat to both government tax collection and the overall domestic economy. Inversion 
activity slowed in 2015 when new anti-inversion regulation further limited MNCs use of 
permanently reinvested foreign earnings and made further attempts to close regulatory 
“loopholes”. The overall impact of this most recent regulation cannot be fully observed at 
this time. It is clear that inversions have slowed, but not stopped completely. Inversion 
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activity within each phase is described below. Table 5 includes a listing of 92 corporate 
inversions since 1983.  
3.2.1.1. Phase I Inversions 
Phase I inversions often took the form of stock-for-stock transfers (i.e. stock 
inversions) whereby U.S. shareholders exchange stock of the U.S. parent for the stock of 
a foreign entity (Desai & Hines, 2002) (Desai M. A., 2002) (Seida & Wempe, 2002) 
(Cloyd, Mills, & Weaver, 2003a) (Cloyd, Mills, & Weaver, 2003b) (Chorvat, 2016). The 
foreign subsidiary is often located in a territorial tax system, tax-haven, lower-tax 
jurisdiction or tax-favored area due to lower corporate tax rates and other favorable tax 
regulation. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands were common relocation destination points 
as they do not impose corporate income tax (Marples & Gravelle, 2014). As displayed in 
Figure 6, shareholders exchange shares in the pre-inversion parent located in a domestic 
tax jurisdiction for shares of a holding company located in a foreign tax jurisdiction. 
Shareholders are required to report a gain on the exchange of stock under U.S. rules 
(Desai & Hines, 2002) (Desai M. A., 2002) (Babkin, Glover, & Levine, 2016) (Chorvat, 
2016). That is, any previously unrecognized gains in shares of the pre-inversion parent 
firm is assessed capital gains tax upon inversion based upon the difference between the 
fair market value and tax basis (i.e. acquisition cost) of shares. While generally not 
assessed on shares held in IRAs and 401(k)s, those shares owned by individual 
stockholders and mutual funds would owe tax regardless of whether they sell (Marples & 
Gravelle, 2014) (Babkin, Glover, & Levine, 2016). 
Taking into account a shareholder’s tax basis, Babkin (2015) values shareholders 
return to inversion and finds that the average shareholder realizes a positive net benefit 
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due to the reduction in corporate income tax. However, shareholder returns were found to 
vary widely and were significantly negative for many shareholders.  
In a similar form of inversion, also displayed in Figure 6, the assets of the pre-
inversion parent located in a domestic tax jurisdiction (DTJ) are transferred to a holding 
company located in a foreign tax jurisdiction (FTJ). For example, referring to Figure 6, 
the assets of the DTJ parent are transferred to the FTJ parent holding company. In 
exchange, stock in the post-inversion foreign parent holding company is transferred to the 
pre-inversion domestic parent (i.e. from the FTJ parent to the DTJ parent). The pre-
inversion domestic parent (i.e. DTJ parent) must recognize a taxable gain based upon the 
difference between the fair value and the cost basis of the assets transferred. Finally, the 
pre-inversion domestic parent (i.e. DTJ parent) is liquidated and shareholders receive 
shares in the post-inversion foreign parent (i.e. FTJ Parent) (Desai & Hines, 2002) 
(Cloyd, Mills, & Weaver, 2003a). As long as the transaction qualifies as a reorganization, 
the shareholders will hold their shares in the post-inversion foreign parent with the same 
tax basis and holding period as with shares of the pre-inversion domestic parent 
(Treasury, 2002). 
Phase I inversions are often referred to as “naked inversions” as they result in 
little movement of control or meaningful economic activity (e.g. headquarters location, 
capital or employment) (Marples & Gravelle, 2014).  That is, the parent’s tax jurisdiction 
(e.g. place of incorporation) changes while business operations and the location of 
executive management remains unaffected. The change in place of incorporation is 
merely a legal change.  In the well-known case of Ingersoll-Rand’s inversion from the 
United States (i.e. New Jersey) to Bermuda, business operations were not impacted, 
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headquarters location did not change, directors and officers did not change, shares 
continued to trade on the NYSE using ticker “IR” and the firm remained a member of the 
S&P 500 index (Goldman, 2008). The Ingersoll-Rand (IR) inversion may be summarized 
into five steps; two of which reveal characteristics of an asset inversion and the remaining 
three steps reveal characteristics of a stock inversion. As Goldman (2008) describes in 
greater detail, the five steps include: (1) pre-merger transfers of shares of IR subsidiaries 
and IR debt issuance to Ingersoll-Rand Limited, a pre-inversion Bermuda subsidiary of 
IR; (2) in exchange, pre-merger IR Ltd. issuance of class B stock to IR and its 
subsidiaries; (3) the creation of Ingersoll-Rand Merger Corporation (IR-MC) for purposes 
of the subsequent merger into IR; (4) conversion of IR Ltd.’s IR-MC shares into IR 
shares; and (5) conversion of IR shares into IR Ltd. Class A shares. Figure 8 and Figure 9 
apply the case of Ingersoll-Rand to the general corporate inversion process and corporate 
structure changes outlined in Figure 6 and Figure 7. The resulting corporate structure 
moved the tax jurisdiction of the parent and foreign subsidiaries outside of the U.S. 
worldwide tax system. Instead, IR Ltd of Bermuda will owe U.S. tax on the business 
conducted by the U.S. subsidiary within the United States.  
The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 (applicable to inversions after 
March 4, 2003) effectively ended Phase I inversions by disallowing the associated tax 
benefits if the post-inversion foreign parent was owned by the pre-inversion domestic 
parent’s shareholders (i.e. owned 80% or greater ownership share) (Marples & Gravelle, 
2014) (Marian, 2015). That is, the post-inversion parent is treated as a domestic firm for 
tax purposes if it does not meet the 80% requirement. Alternatively, if less than 80% 
ownership, but greater than 60%, the inverted firm owes domestic taxes on asset transfers 
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but is not treated as a domestic firm. However, inversion activity continued even after the 
AJCA. Perhaps as an unintended consequence of the AJCA, many argue that MNCs were 
encouraged to conduct corporate inversions using methods that result in the movement of 
meaningful economic activity (Rao, 2015). Two primary methods of inverting post-
AJCA were through mergers or purchases of smaller foreign firms (Marian, 2015). Both 
methods are commonly used in Phase II inversions and are more likely to result in the 
movement of economic activity such as an increase in foreign sales. 
3.2.1.2. Phase II Inversions (post-2004) 
The AJCA did not disallow tax benefits associated with inversions where the 
MNC can demonstrate substantial business operations in the post-inversion parent’s 
location. The percentage requirement to meet “substantial” was initially set at 10% but 
has since been increased (e.g. 25% of group income in June 2012) (Marples & Gravelle, 
2014). A U.S. MNC could merge with a smaller foreign firm whereby at least 25% of the 
new foreign parent’s employees, assets and sales were located in the new foreign 
jurisdiction (Marian, 2015). As the required percentage of business operations in the post-
inversion parent’s location increased, this method of inversion also became less common.  
In addition, the AJCA did not prevent MNCs from merging with a foreign 
corporation to avoid ownership requirements. Ownership requirements are avoided if pre-
inversion shareholders own 80% or less ownership share of the post-inversion foreign 
parent (Marples & Gravelle, 2014) (Marian, 2015). MNCs often utilize a holding 
company loaded with debt in order to acquire target firms (i.e. debt push-down strategies) 
and avoid the 80% ownership (Belz, Robinson, Ruf, & Steffens, 2013). However, further 
regulatory action taken in September, 2014 limits inverted firms access to accumulated 
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unrepatriated foreign earnings and closed “loopholes” allowing firms to avoid the 80% 
rule previously discussed (Marples & Gravelle, 2014).  
3.2.2. Corporate Inversion Incentives 
MNCs must weigh the tax consequences and incentives in determining whether 
corporate inversion will benefit the firm. Consequences include the taxes associated with 
capital gains previously discussed as well as withholding taxes on payments made to the 
post-inversion parent (Desai & Hines, 2002) (Desai M. A., 2002). However, there are 
several potential incentives to invert the corporate structure. Underlying each potential 
incentive is the desire to legally avoid corporate income tax. Corporate income tax 
avoided through inversion is often measured by the corporate income tax rate and the 
financial statement effective tax rate (ETR) (Seida & Wempe, 2002). Corporate inversion 
allows the MNC to avoid domestic corporate income tax on both domestic earnings and 
foreign earnings (e.g. avoid U.S. tax on income earned within the U.S. and income earned 
offshore). In examining the abnormal returns associated with 1- and 5-day windows 
comparing a small sample (19) of inverting firm stock returns with the S&P 500 index, 
Desai (2002) found that the probability of inverting increased with firm size, proportion 
of foreign assets, leverage and tax-haven utilization. Firm size, proportion of foreign 
assets and leverage represent determinants that were previously described in evaluating 
tax-haven utilization. Thus, as one might expect, inverting firms are also commonly those 
that utilize tax-havens.  
Depending on the MNC’s specific corporate and tax structure (e.g. pre- and post-
inversion corporate tax rate, tax system, accumulated unrepatriated earnings, etc.), 
incentives to invert differ among entities. Corporate inversions allow MNCs to reduce the 
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global effective tax rate using one or more of several related corporate tax avoidance 
strategies. For instance, using a sample of 12 inversion firms and 24 matched control 
firms, (Seida & Wempe, 2004) found a 11.52% reduction in the effective tax rate of 
inverted firms. The reductions in tax liabilities are not associated solely with the pre-
inversion and post-inversion parent entities. The corporate group is able to benefit from 
many of the corporate tax avoidance strategies accessible through corporate inversion 
(Chorvat, 2016).  
Certain strategies are inherently beneficial such as inverting the corporate 
structure to place the MNC parent company in a jurisdiction with a lower corporate tax 
rate. Similarly, if the parent is relocated within a territorial tax system, the MNC will no 
longer owe worldwide tax in its domestic tax jurisdiction. There are additional benefits to 
MNCs that, prior to the inversion, had accumulated earnings in foreign jurisdictions 
which were unrepatriated. Post-inversion the MNC is able to access previously 
unrepatriated earnings without incurring tax liabilities associated with repatriation. Desai 
(2002) notes that MNCs benefit from both a reduction in taxes associated with 
repatriation and a reduction in the costs associated with avoiding such taxes.  
In addition to the methods described above which allow the MNC to avoid home-
country (pre-inversion) tax on foreign-source earnings (i.e. worldwide tax), MNCs utilize 
additional corporate tax avoidance strategies to avoid home-country (pre-inversion) tax 
on domestic-source earnings (Seida & Wempe, 2004). These additional corporate tax 
avoidance strategies are less discernable or direct, yet are quite beneficial. These promote 
tax savings through more complex transactions, strategic arrangements and allocation of 
company assets and liabilities and include the earnings shifting strategies previously 
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discussed. Such strategies allow the MNC to relocate its earnings to the most tax-
favorable jurisdiction. Seida (2004) found that the majority of tax savings realized by 
inverted firms relates to the avoidance of U.S. tax on U.S. earnings. MNCs also 
strategically locate intangible asset development to reduce the corporate tax burden 
(Chorvat, 2016). Highly leveraged MNCs also benefit from the ability to more fully 
utilize debt related tax-deductible interest expense (i.e. interest tax shields) (Desai & 
Hines, 2002) (Desai M. A., 2002). 
3.2.3. Earnings Shifting, Earnings Stripping and Permanently Reinvested 
Earnings 
Corporate earnings shifting and earnings stripping refers to corporate tax 
avoidance strategies whereby MNCs relocate taxable earnings from higher-tax 
jurisdictions to lower-tax jurisdictions. Several methods of corporate earnings shifting 
have been discussed which involve aggressive transfer pricing, debt allocation strategies 
and utilization of intangible assets. Each of these methods allows a MNC to utilize 
foreign subsidiaries located in tax-favorable jurisdictions to “shift” earnings away from 
the higher-tax jurisdiction or “strip” earnings from the higher-tax jurisdiction (e.g. tax 
deductible expenses such as interest expense incurred on debt) and lower its effective tax 
rate. Tax savings achieved through such methods are believed to outweigh the tax savings 
achieved through simply reducing the corporate tax rate or avoiding worldwide tax (Seida 
& Wempe, 2002) (Treasury, 2002). Marples (2014) suggests that “a lot of income from 
foreign sources is really U.S. income in disguise.” That is, income shifted from the U.S. 
to foreign jurisdictions.  
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As a result of such earnings shifting, MNCs accumulate large sums of earnings in 
(often lower-tax) foreign subsidiaries. Under a worldwide tax system, such permanently 
reinvested earnings (also known as unrepatriated foreign earnings, cash hoards, trapped 
earnings, locked-out earnings or constrained earnings) remain untaxed by the MNCs 
domestic tax system until repatriated or invested in domestic assets. Thus, permanently 
reinvested earnings (PRE) are “retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries for which no 
domestic income tax has been recognized” (Bryant-Kutcher, Eiler, & Guenther, 2008). 
Bryant-Kutcher (2008) make a distinction between PRE reinvested in foreign operating 
assets versus foreign financial assets which incur domestic tax only on investment 
income (i.e. U.S. Subpart F rules). While the MNC might often develop foreign 
reinvestment strategies sufficient to satisfy firm shareholders, feasible reinvestment 
strategies are not permanently sustainable. To the extent that positive net present value 
projects are no longer available for reinvestment, permanently reinvested earnings is held 
in cash or cash equivalents. However, external to the firm it is difficult to determine the 
proportion of corporate cash held in foreign jurisdictions.  
Thus, rather than repatriate PRE (e.g. to fund dividends or treasury stock), MNCs 
first exhaust profit maximizing foreign operating investment opportunities and then 
pursue foreign income generating financial asset investments. Foley (2007) examines 
whether the magnitude of cash held by MNCs is due to the efforts of firms to avoid 
corporate repatriation tax and finds that higher repatriation tax burdens result in higher 
cash balances (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, & Twite, 2007). MNCs erode the domestic tax 
base through a combination of such PRE investment strategies and tax related arbitrage 
strategies (Kleinbard, 2011). For instance, in order to meet domestic cash flow needs, 
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MNCs supplant “locked-out” earnings with domestic borrowing. Related domestic 
interest expense deductions reduce domestic taxable earnings and erode the domestic tax 
base. The simultaneous “locked-out” earnings, which are often earning domestically-
untaxed returns offshore, and available domestic borrowing create opportunities for tax 
arbitrage.  
In addition, firms can avoid domestic tax on unrepatriated foreign earnings by 
inverting the corporate structure (Marian, 2015). As shown in Figure 7, pre-inversion 
repatriations from the foreign jurisdiction to the domestic jurisdiction incur repatriation 
tax. Post-inversion, the newly created foreign parent has access to the previously 
unrepatriated foreign earnings as well as future foreign earnings of foreign subsidiaries 
and bypasses the pre-inversion domestic parent (post-inversion domestic subsidiary) 
entirely. Thus, post-inversion it becomes unnecessary for the MNC to transfer to the 
domestic tax jurisdiction and repatriation tax is avoided.  
As PRE accrue in the foreign subsidiaries of MNCs, the value implications of 
such earnings becomes an increasingly important question. Given that there is a limited 
set of optimal reinvestment opportunities in the foreign jurisdiction, one can expect that 
suboptimal reinvestment strategies are implemented in regard to permanently reinvested 
earnings (Kleinbard, 2011). To the extent that shareholders suspect being disadvantaged 
by PRE, they likely perceive value in the firm’s ability to access unrepatriated earnings 
through corporate inversion. That is, without paying repatriation tax to the domestic 
jurisdiction.  
3.2.4. Market Response to Inversion Announcements 
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Prior literature has attempted to evaluate the markets’ response to announcements 
of corporate inversions. The methodologies used and related results have varied widely 
and overall resulted in inconclusive findings. Cloyd (2003) notes that “economic theory 
suggests that the change in share price at the time of the inversion announcement should 
reflect the present value of the expected net benefit to shareholders”. However, overall 
prior literature regarding the market response to inversion announcements lacks any 
conclusive evidence that the market reacts positively or negatively. Relevant prior 
literature is summarized below. It is important to note that none of the prior literature 
described below incorporate permanently reinvested earnings into the research 
methodology in the manner described in this research methodology.  
Given the limited number of inverted firms, many of the relevant prior literature 
noted below including (Desai & Hines, 2002) (Seida & Wempe, 2002) (Seida & Wempe, 
2003) (Cloyd, Mills, & Weaver, 2003a) (Cloyd, Mills, & Weaver, 2003b) incorporate the 
same firms in their samples. Of the 19 firms studied by Seida (2003), 18 are used in one 
or both of Desai (2002) and Cloyd (2003a, 2003b) (Seida, 2003).  
Dasai (2002) employs three methodologies to evaluate the economic factors of 
corporate inversions, one of which is an event study. Desai (2002) analyzed “one-day and 
five-day differences between returns to holding identified stocks and the returns to 
holding the S&P500 index”. Desai (2002) found that stock prices react on average 
positively to inversion announcements (10 of 19 firms) with a 1.7 percent appreciation 
over a five-day window. The price appreciation was more pronounced for those that were 
highly leveraged or had increased in value over the prior year. However, these findings 
were not statistically significant.  
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Seida and Wempe (2002) also employ an event study methodology and analyze 
cumulative abnormal returns associated with the market’s response to inversion 
announcements (i.e. board approval and shareholder approval) over a three-day window 
using the S&P500 index (i.e. estimation window of -260 through -11). While abnormal 
returns associated with board approval, on average, are not found statistically significant, 
the mean cumulative abnormal returns associated with shareholder approval are found 
statistically significant. Seida and Wempe (2002) further separate firms into pre- and 
post-Autumn 2001 and find that the market’s reaction post-2001 does not uphold 
statistical significance.  
Seida and Wempe (2003) extended the 2002 study of cumulative abnormal 
returns associated with inversion announcements and found that such market reaction is 
associated with certain “tax profiles” or firm attributes such as foreign tax credits and 
post-inversion realized changes in effective tax rates.  
Cloyd (2003a, 2003b) utilize approximate randomization procedures to 
investigate the market’s response to inversion announcements for a sample of 19 inverted 
MNCs by comparing firm level and portfolio abnormal returns. Testing the statistical 
significance of cumulative abnormal returns (i.e. two-day and five-day) around the 
inversion date, Cloyd (2003) found only 9 with significant returns; 7 of which were 
negative and “find no evidence to suggest that share prices increase in response to 
inversion announcements”. Both the S&P500 and CRSP daily value-weighted market 
return are used as proxies by randomly selecting two or five days over a 250-trading day 
period (i.e. -250 to -5). Through descriptive analysis, Cloyd (2003) also compared 
inverting firms to industry averages and found that inverting firms are larger, have lower 
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leverage, higher ETRs and decreased stock prices. However, post-inversion leverage and 
ETRs moved closer to industry averages.  
None of the above event studies find statistically significant abnormal returns, on 
average, associated with board approval and announcement (Desai & Hines, 2002) (Desai 
M. A., 2002) (Seida & Wempe, 2002) (Seida & Wempe, 2003) (Cloyd, Mills, & Weaver, 
2003b). However, some evidence of statistically significant abnormal returns associated 
with shareholder approval and announcement is identified. 
In addition, Chorvat (2015) employs a bootstrap methodology (i.e. running 
random combinations of an equal number of S&P500 companies as inverting companies 
in order to compile hypothetical investment portfolios) and notes statistically significant 
excess returns in the years post-inversion. This methodology models the abnormal return 
“as the cumulative average return to a buy and hold portfolio of inverting firms” 
(Chorvat, 2016). Given the time lag between the inversion announcement and the 
calculation of the market price-based tax cost of the inversion (i.e. at the inversion date), 
Chorvat (2016) infers that managers must believe they have asymmetric information 
regarding company value. Otherwise, managers would not expose shareholders to 
inversion-related gains.  
Babkin (2015) examine a sample of 73 corporate inversions from 1983 to 2014 by 
using equity returns for inversion transactions and computing CARs from a market model 
of expected returns. Babkin (2015) uses an estimation window of -120 through -21 and a 
5-day event window. Similar to prior literature, many of the inversions studied resulted in 
low or negative (approximately 60% positive) CAR around the inversion date. 
3.3. Research Question(s) 
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As described above, an examination of the market response to inversion 
announcements has led to inconclusive results overall. In addition, prior literature does 
not consider the impact of earnings shifting (i.e. through permanently reinvested 
earnings) on the estimated change in share value due to corporate inversions. To the 
extent that shareholders view large pre-inversion permanently reinvested earnings 
negatively due to expected reductions in the firm’s ability to maximize share value, 
shareholders are expected to increase their value of the inverting firm. That is, share 
value should increase more for an inverting firm with permanently reinvested earnings 
than one without. As discussed further in the following methodology (e.g. H2): 
 
All else being equal, inverting firms with aggressive earnings shifting strategies, as 
evidenced by permanently reinvested earnings, will realize a more significant market 
value reaction to corporate inversion. 
 
3.4. Data and Methodology 
An event study methodology is used to measure the market’s reaction to the 
inversion announcement. If the market expects that the inversion will have a positive 
impact on firm value, then one may expect market participants to incorporate such 
information into the price of the security resulting in a price increase in response to the 
inversion announcement. As noted previously, examination of the market response to 
inversion announcements has led to inconclusive results overall. Therefore, firm-specific 
positive and negative cumulative abnormal returns as well as varied results regarding the 
significance of such returns are expected in the current analysis. However, furthering 
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prior literature, the permanently reinvested earnings of inverting firms is considered in 
relation to the cumulative abnormal returns described below. 
Since its introduction in foundational literature such as (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & 
Roll, 1969), the event study has become widely known for studying the market reaction 
to a particular event. The event study methodology may be organized into a five-step 
process (Dasgupta, Laplante, & Mamingi, 1998). First, the events and event windows are 
identified. The events in the current research are the announcements of corporate 
inversions. The event window describes the time period, before and after the event, that is 
analyzed to determine the market’s reaction to the event. Event windows of 3-days, 5-
days (i.e. two days prior and two days subsequent to the event) and 9-days are used. 
Next, the sample of firms is selected. As previously described, corporate 
inversions have a long history dating back to the 1980’s. Lists of inversion 
announcements have been published most recently by Babkin (2015) and Rao (2015) (i.e. 
Table 5: Corporate Expatriations, 1982 – 2016) as well as others such as Desai and Hines 
(2002). While the research questions and approach differ in such prior work, the 
corporate inversion announcement data may be utilized in the current work. While the 
current research utilizes the firm’s announcement of the corporate inversion as the event 
date, it is recognized that the ability to observe changes in share value may be impacted 
by any “noise” surrounding the event date (e.g. early release of inversion information 
prior to formal announcement).  
For each of the inverted firms, as shown in Table 5, equity return data is acquired 
via DataStream over both the event windows (3-day, 5-day and 9-day) and estimation 
window (-120 through -30) as described below. In addition, permanently reinvested 
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earnings for each firm is manually identified (i.e. as made available in financial 
statements and related notes) around the inversion announcement date.  Identification of 
firm-specific permanently reinvested earnings will permit the comparison of event study 
abnormal returns to permanently reinvested earnings as shown in Figure 10.  
Next, a “normal” return is estimated for each security under the assumption that 
the event did not take place. Various models may be used to estimate the normal return 
including the market model described below, which assumes a linear relationship 
between the returns of a security and a market portfolio (Dasgupta, Laplante, & Mamingi, 
1998) (Babkin, Glover, & Levine, 2016). The following model is estimated over a 90-day 
period 30 days prior to the event (i.e. the estimation window or t = -120 to t -30) in order 
to estimate the normal return:  !",$ = &" + ("!),$ + *",$ 
 
where + is the time index and + = 0 is the date of the inversion announcement, - is the 
firm security (equity), !",$ is the equity return for firm - at time +, !),$ is the return on the 
market portfolio at time +. The error term for security - at time + is *",$. Using the 
resulting &"	and (" from the above equation, the following estimated normal return is 
calculated for the event window: !",$∗ = &" + ("!),$ 
 
where !",$∗  is the expected return for firm - at date +; and where &" and (" are the estimated 
coefficients for firm - in the regression.  
Next, the estimated abnormal return (i.e. AR or the difference between the actual 
return and estimated normal return) is calculated for the event window as: 01",$ = !",$ − &" − ("!),$ 
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Similarly, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around firm -’s inversion announcement 
are calculated (as follows using a 5-day event window): 
301" = (!",$ − !",$∗56$789 ) 
 
Finally, a t-test is performed to determine whether the abnormal return is statistically 
different from zero. The test is performed for each individual event as well as the 
aggregate abnormal returns for all events.  
After completing the event study methodology, a cross-sectional analysis is 
performed to determine whether cumulative abnormal returns are associated with firm-
specific variables, country-specific variables and other control variables as noted below 
and in Equation 1. This includes permanently reinvested earnings. 
Given the long timespan over which inversions have taken place and the 
numerous regulatory changes that have been implemented, the phase of the inversion 
(PHASE) is included in the cross-sectional analysis. If regulatory actions have been 
successful in terms of governmental tax revenue collection, then firms conducting Phase I 
inversions are expected to demonstrate greater cumulative abnormal returns than those 
conducted in later years. That is, shareholders place a greater value on Phase I inversions 
as there were fewer regulations preventing firms from generating value (e.g. reducing tax 
liabilities) from the inversion transactions. 
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H1: All else being equal, Phase I inversions are expected to demonstrate greater 
cumulative abnormal returns than those conducted in later years (i.e. Phase II and 
forward).  
 
As previously discussed, permanently reinvested earnings in foreign jurisdictions 
are expected to increase the value of the inversion to the shareholder. Subsequent to the 
inversion the firm will have access to such earnings without paying standard corporate 
tax to the original domestic jurisdiction. Shareholders are expected to view such access 
positively as the earnings may be utilized in a manner that maximizes shareholder wealth 
rather than simply minimizing taxes. Permanently reinvested earnings reported near the 
inversion date are included in the cross-sectional analysis (PRE). Unfortunately, such 
earnings are not commonly reported. Only 28 of the 56 firms studied in the cumulative 
abnormal return model and cross sectional analysis report permanently reinvested 
earnings. Shareholders are expected to place a greater value on the shares of inverting 
firms with permanently reinvested earnings. Therefore, inverting firms with greater 
permanently reinvested earnings are expected to generate greater cumulative abnormal 
returns. 
 
H2: All else being equal, inverting firms with greater permanently reinvested earnings are 
expected to demonstrate greater cumulative abnormal returns.  
 
Also included in the cross-sectional analysis are three of the firm-level incentives 
to shift earnings; Multinationality (MULT), Thin Capitalization (TCAP) and Intangible 
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assets (INTANG). Firms that demonstrate a higher degree of such firm-level incentives 
are more likely to shift earnings, utilize tax havens to do so (Richardson & Taylor, 2015), 
and thus are expected to accumulate more permanently reinvested earnings. As described 
above, greater PRE is expected to result in higher levels of cumulative abnormal returns. 
Multinationality is evaluated as the degree of foreign operations (i.e. foreign revenue) as 
compared to domestic operations (i.e. domestic revenue). Thin Capitalization is evaluated 
based upon the debt to equity ratio and interest coverage ratio. Intangible assets are 
evaluated based upon the proportion of non-monetary and non-physical assets to total 
assets. All financial data is as of the fiscal year ended prior to the inversion date. 
 
H3: All else being equal, inverting firms with greater levels of multinationality are 
expected to demonstrate greater cumulative abnormal returns.  
 
H4: All else being equal, inverting firms with higher levels of thin capitalization are 
expected to demonstrate greater cumulative abnormal returns.  
 
H5: All else being equal, inverting firms with greater intangible assets are expected to 
demonstrate greater cumulative abnormal returns.  
 
A country’s corporate tax rate is expected to impact a firm’s decision to conduct 
corporate tax avoidance strategies including corporate inversion as firms seek to 
minimize corporate tax liabilities. A higher corporate tax rate in the pre-inversion 
domestic jurisdiction of the parent company, as compared to the post-inversion 
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jurisdiction, is expected to generate greater tax savings associated with inverting the 
corporate structure to a lower tax jurisdiction. As such, shareholders are expected to place 
a greater value on corporate inversions where the difference between the corporate tax 
rate of the pre-inversion and post-inversion jurisdiction is greater. The country-specific 
post-inversion corporate tax rate for each firm is included in the cross-sectional analysis 
(TRATE). Since many of the firms studied invert the corporate structure to a tax haven 
jurisdiction, this variable often equals zero. A lower corporate tax rate in the post-
inversion jurisdiction results in a greater difference between the corporate tax rate of the 
pre-inversion and post-inversion jurisdiction. The greater the difference between pre- and 
post-inversion tax rates, the greater the value shareholders are expected to place on the 
shares of inverting firms. 
 
H6: All else being equal, inverting firms with greater post-inversion corporate tax rates 
are expected to demonstrate lower cumulative abnormal returns.  
 
Each of the variables described above in H1 through H6 are reported in Table 8 
along with the predicted sign for each variable. 56 firm-level observations are used to 
estimate the following equation. 
 301 = 	(;<=0>? + (9<1? + (6@ABC + (DC30< + (EFGC0GH + (IC10C? + J 
 
where: 
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CAR; is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return as estimated in the event study previously 
described.  
PHASE; is a binary variable coded as 1 if the corporate inversion was announced prior to 
Phase II (2006 to 2014); 0 otherwise.  
PRE; is firm-specific permanently reinvested earnings in foreign jurisdictions. 
MULT; is firm-specific foreign percentage of total revenue. 
TCAP; is the firm-specific debt to equity ratio multiplied by the interest coverage ratio. 
INTANG; is the firm-specific percent of total assets invested in intangibles. 
TRATE; is the corporate tax rate in the target foreign country (i.e. post-inversion 
corporate tax rate). Tax rates used are those in the year the firm-specific corporate 
inversion was announced. 
3.5. Results 
Table 6 reports the results of the cumulative abnormal return model for 3-day, 5-day 
and 9-day event windows. The 3-day event window resulted in 28 firms with negative 
cumulative abnormal returns and 28 firms with positive abnormal returns. Cumulative 
abnormal returns for six firms were significant as shown by the results of t-tests. Of those 
that were deemed significant, positive cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for 
four firms and negative cumulative abnormal returns for two firms.  
The 5-day event window resulted in 27 firms with negative cumulative abnormal 
returns and 29 firms with positive abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns for 
five firms were significant as shown by the results of t-tests. Of those that were deemed 
significant, positive cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for three firms and 
negative cumulative abnormal returns for two firms. 
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The 9-day event window resulted in 25 firms with negative cumulative abnormal 
returns and 31 firms with positive abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns for 
eleven firms were significant as shown by the results of t-tests. Of those that were 
deemed significant, positive cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for six firms 
and negative cumulative abnormal returns for the remaining five firms. 
Table 7 reports the results of the t-test performed to determine whether the aggregate 
abnormal return is statistically different from zero. The 3-day, 5-day and 9-day aggregate 
abnormal return are not found statistically significant.  
The cumulative abnormal return model reveals inconclusive findings overall. While it 
is expected that shareholders value the announcement of the corporate inversion, such 
value is not consistently demonstrated in the cumulative abnormal return model’s results. 
In each of the 3-day, 5-day and 9-day event windows, approximately half (i.e. 50%, 
51.8% and 55%, respectively) of the firms reveal negative cumulative abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, the majority of firm-specific cumulative abnormal returns are not found 
significant per t-tests (i.e. 10.7%, 8.9% and 19.6%, respectively). In addition, 3-day, 5-
day and 9-day aggregate abnormal returns are not found statistically significant. As such, 
the results of the cumulative abnormal return model do not present conclusive evidence 
that shareholders value the corporate inversion. Next, the 3-day, 5-day and 9-day 
cumulative abnormal returns are used as the dependent variable in cross-sectional 
analysis and results are evaluated below. 
The results of the cross sectional analysis model are summarized on Table 8 and 
shown in detail on Table 9. Both permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) and Intangibles 
(INTANG) were found statistically significant when using cumulative abnormal returns 
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from the 3-day event window. The phase of the inversion (PHASE), multinationality 
(MULT) and intangible assets (INTANG) revealed a coefficient estimate that met the 
predicted sign. Permanently reinvested earnings (PRE), thin capitalization (TCAP) and 
the corporate tax rate (CTRATE) revealed a coefficient estimate opposite of the predicted 
sign. The variance in 3-day cumulative abnormal returns explained by the model is 
presented in the r-squared value of 46.12%. The 3-day model is found statistically 
significant as shown by the p-value of 0.0182. 
The cross sectional analysis using 5-day cumulative abnormal returns reveals results 
similar to the 5-day model. Both permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) and Intangibles 
(INTANG) were found statistically significant when using cumulative abnormal returns 
from the 5-day event window. One additional variable, the Corporate Tax Rate (TRATE), 
revealed a coefficient estimate that met the predicted sign. The variance in 5-day 
cumulative abnormal returns explained by the model is presented in the r-squared value 
of 41.21%. The 5-day model is found statistically significant as shown by the p-value of 
0.0083. 
The cross sectional analysis using 9-day cumulative abnormal returns reveals results 
similar to the 3-day and 5-day model. Permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) remained 
statistically significant when using cumulative abnormal returns from the 9-day event 
window. However, while intangibles (INTANG) is near significant with a t-value of 1.69, 
no other variables were found statistically significant. As with the 3-day model, the phase 
of the inversion (PHASE), multinationality (MULT) and intangible assets (INTANG) 
revealed a coefficient estimate that met the predicted sign. The variance in 9-day 
cumulative abnormal returns explained by the model is presented in the r-squared value 
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of 30.45%. The 9-day model is found statistically significant as shown by the p-value of 
0.0093. 
Overall, the cross sectional analysis model reveals little conclusive evidence 
regarding the ability to explain the variance in cumulative abnormal returns. While 
permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) is consistently statistically significant, the 
coefficient is consistently opposite of the predicted sign. This implies that shareholders 
place a lower value on the corporate inversions of firms with higher permanently 
reinvested earnings. Such findings are counterintuitive and conflict with the arguments 
presented in this essay. While the coefficient estimates for the phase of the inversion 
(PHASE), multinationality (MULT) and intangible assets (INTANG) consistently meet 
the predicted sign, only intangible assets (INTANG) is statistically significant (i.e. in 
both the 3-day and 5-day models). As such, the results of cross sectional analysis 
demonstrate that greater intangibles result in shareholders placing greater value on the 
shares of inverting firms. However, conclusive findings are not observed for the other 
variables in the model including the phase of the inversion (PHASE), multinationality 
(MULT), thin capitalization (TCAP) or the corporate tax rate (CTRATE). 
3.6. Conclusions 
The question of whether corporate inversions should be viewed positively from a 
financial standpoint may be considered from the perspective of the country and the firm. 
From the perspective of the firm, the corporate inversion’s impact is largely focused on 
the reduction in corporate tax liabilities (e.g. lower corporate tax rate, favorable tax 
regulation, successful implementation of corporate tax avoidance methods, etc.). To the 
extent that firms are successful in reducing corporate taxes in excess of the costs of 
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inverting, the inversion is expected to provide positive financial benefits.  In addition, 
shareholders are expected to incorporate the value of such benefits into the firm’s share 
value.  
 The analysis of inverting firm’s cumulative abnormal returns revealed both 
positive and negative returns around the inversion announcement date. Given the positive 
cumulative abnormal returns, it does appear that shareholders incorporate the financial 
benefits of corporate inversions into the share value of some firms. However, given a 
nearly equal number of firms with negative cumulative abnormal returns and overall lack 
of statistical significance, one cannot reach any overarching conclusions regarding the 
value shareholders place on corporate inversions. Therefore, one may seek to identify the 
firm characteristics that promote positive valuation by shareholders.  
The analysis of firm and inversion characteristics using cumulative abnormal returns 
and cross-sectional analysis revealed that permanently reinvested earnings in foreign 
jurisdictions impacts the value shareholders place on the corporate inversion 
announcement. Interestingly, shareholders appear to place a lower value on the corporate 
inversions of firms with greater permanently reinvested earnings. While unexpected, this 
finding may be related to the most recent set of anti-inversion regulation like those 
proposed by the Hilary Clinton U.S. presidential campaign (Hillary Clinton Presidential 
Campaign, 2016). The newest set of anti-inversion regulation seeks to further increase the 
required foreign shareholder ownership that must exist before the firm is considered 
foreign by U.S. tax law. That is, before the firm can avoid U.S. corporate tax. In addition, 
such regulation seeks to impose an “exit tax” on the permanently reinvested earnings of 
the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms and impose further restrictions to limit earnings 
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stripping. Although the inversions reviewed in this essay predate this newest set of 
regulations, savvy investors and analysts are likely well aware of proposed anti-inversion 
regulation and the trend in limiting inversion activity and related benefits.  As such, the 
estimated tax liabilities associated with permanently reinvested earnings may impact the 
value shareholders place on corporate inversions.  
The analysis of firm and inversion characteristics using cumulative abnormal returns 
and cross-sectional analysis also revealed that greater firm intangible assets lead to 
greater cumulative abnormal returns in inverting firms. As such, intangibles may serve as 
a signal to investors that the firm is positioned to take advantage of the corporate tax 
avoidance methods available post-corporate inversion.  
4. Overall Conclusions, Policy Implications and Future Research 
4.1. Overall Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The two enclosed essays are motivated by gaps in the literature regarding the firm-
level impact associated with a government restructuring the corporate tax system from 
worldwide to territorial as well as the change in firm value associated with 
announcements of corporate inversions of firms in relation to firm characteristics such as 
the level of permanently reinvested earnings. While both essays consider the 
phenomenon of corporate tax avoidance, the first essay focuses on firm behavior in 
relation to governmental tax structure and the second essay focuses on the shareholder’s 
valuation of corporate inversion; perhaps the most extreme form of corporate tax 
avoidance methods.  
Results from the first essay on worldwide and territorial tax systems demonstrated 
little evidence that firms utilize fewer tax havens or demonstrate fewer incentives to 
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utilize tax havens to conduct corporate tax avoidance methods. That is, as a result of a 
transition from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. In fact, the majority of 
firms increased tax haven utilization and demonstrated consistent or increased incentives 
such as multinationality and intangible assets. For instance, findings from the first essay 
revealed that UK firm’s intangible assets increased (i.e. 9/10 of the firms studied 
increased in total value and 8/10 of the firms studied increased the percentage of 
intangibles) and generally trended upward (i.e. 6/10 of the firms studied) over the UK 
corporate tax reform period.  
Results from the second essay on corporate inversions, earnings shifting and the value 
implications of cash hoards did not reveal any overarching conclusions regarding the firm 
value shareholders place on corporate inversions. However, certain firm characteristics 
such as permanently reinvested earnings and intangible assets demonstrated a relationship 
to the level of cumulative abnormal returns associated with the corporate inversion 
announcement. Thus, the second essay provides evidence that shareholders value higher 
intangible assets while the first essay provides evidence that firms increase intangible 
assets despite the government’s effort to transition to a territorial tax system.  
Given the results of the two related essays, one may consider – from the perspective 
of the country – the question of whether corporate inversions should be viewed positively 
as well as policy implications to mitigate the effects. This uncovers an opposing 
conclusion as compared to the earlier analysis from the perspective of the firm. At best, 
the corporate inversion results in lower corporate tax revenue realized by the government 
entity. At worst, the corporate inversion results in lower corporate tax revenue and the 
movement of employment, business activity, management expertise, research and 
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development and other home-country benefits to foreign jurisdictions. As such, 
government entities view corporate inversions as harmful to the overall economic health 
of the country.  
The current U.S. presidential candidates both approach the issue of corporate 
inversions and corporate tax avoidance in their formal proposed tax policy. Trump’s tax 
policy focuses on limiting such activity through a reduction to the corporate tax rate 
(Trump Presidential Campaign, 2016). As mentioned above, Clinton’s tax policy focuses 
on the required foreign ownership of firms, an “exit tax” and earnings shifting (Hillary 
Clinton Presidential Campaign, 2016). As many of the corporate tax avoidance methods 
mentioned in this essay involve the utilization of tax havens, it is unlikely that a lower 
corporate tax rate will have a significant impact on corporate tax avoidance including 
corporate inversions. Firms will continue to have incentives to conduct corporate tax 
avoidance methods as long as there are foreign jurisdictions with lower tax rates and 
favorable tax regulations as compared to the U.S. As such, a plan that focuses on the 
specific benefits of corporate tax avoidance including corporate inversion will likely have 
the most significant impact. As shown by the results of the cross sectional analysis, 
policy that focuses on permanently reinvested earnings and earnings shifting using 
intangible assets is an important starting point.  
4.2. Implications for Future Research 
The first essay on worldwide and territorial tax systems reviewed the behavior of a set 
of 10 UK firms in 5 sectors over the UK’s corporate tax reform period. As such, caution 
must be used in applying the findings from this essay to wider groups of firms, industries 
or countries. In order to analyze the tax haven utilization of firms, one must identify the 
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location of firm subsidiaries over time. Unfortunately, this information is not widely 
available. As such, in the current case analysis, subsidiary location was hand collected at 
observation dates for selected firms. However, once acquired, broad historical subsidiary 
location data would permit a much more comprehensive review of firms. An empirical 
model may be used to evaluate a large set of firms within the UK during the corporate tax 
reform period. Additionally, other countries that have transitioned to a territorial tax 
system could be evaluated. In this effort, the body of evidence regarding firm behavior 
will expand and consist of a large set of firms within multiple countries. This will 
promote cross country comparison of firm behavior in the event of a tax system 
transition. The results from such analysis will likely provide more robust findings that 
could be applied broadly. Governments will likely have significant interest in such 
findings as they inform the policy issues surrounding corporate tax avoidance and 
corporate inversion.  
The second essay on corporate inversions utilized a cumulative abnormal returns 
model and a cross-sectional analysis. The cumulative abnormal returns model relied upon 
share price data for a set of firms that inverted the corporate structure. This set of firms is 
limited. However, the subsequent cross-sectional analysis focused on firm characteristics 
and their relationship to the returns calculated in the cumulative abnormal return model. 
Permanently reinvested earnings were identified as particularly important given the 
firm’s ability to access such earnings after inverting the corporate structure. Shareholders 
are also expected to value such earnings given that they were previously “trapped” and 
unable to be used to maximize profits. Once again, permanently reinvested earnings were 
not widely reported. Thus, limited permanently reinvested earnings data was manually 
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located for the set of inverting firms. However, once acquired, broad permanently 
reinvested earnings data would permit a much more comprehensive review of this 
important firm characteristic in relation to cumulative abnormal returns. The results from 
such analysis will likely provide more robust findings that could deviate from the 
negative impact to cumulative abnormal returns found in this essay. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Tax Haven Countries 
 
Table 1. Tax Haven Countries 
Caribbean/ 
West Indies 
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, 
Monserrat, Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, U.S. Virgin Islands 
Central America Belize, Costa Rica, Panama 
Coast of East 
Asia 
Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore 
Europe/ 
Mediterranean 
Andorra, Channel Islands (Guernsey and Jersey), Cyprus, 
Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland 
Indian Ocean Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles 
Middle East Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon 
North Atlantic Bermuda 
Pacific, South 
Pacific 
Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Nauru, Niue, Tonga, 
Vanuatu 
West Africa Liberia 
Sources: Gravelle (2015) 
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Table 2. Tax-Haven and Total Subsidiaries of Selected Firms 
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Table 3. Location of Tax-Haven Subsidiaries of Selected Firms (2011) 
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Table 4. Descriptive Data for Selected Firms (Average 2009 – 2015) 
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Table 5. Corporate Inversions 1982 – 2016 
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Table 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (3-day, 5-day and 9-day Event Windows) 
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Table 7. Significance of CAR – All Firms (3-day, 5-day and 9-day Event Windows) 
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Table 8. Results of Cross Sectional Analysis using Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 97 
Table 9. Results of Cross Sectional Analysis using Cumulative Abnormal Returns (3-day, 
5-day and 9-day Event Windows) 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Example Scenarios of Thinly Capitalized Foreign Subsidiaries 
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Figure 2: Corporate Structure and Process for Conducting Corporate Tax Avoidance 
involving Transfer Pricing and Intangible Assets 
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Figure 3: Corporate Structure and Process for Conducting Corporate Tax Avoidance 
involving Transfer Pricing and Intangible Assets: Google, Inc. 
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Figure 4: United Kingdom Corporate Tax Reform Plan Timeline 
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Figure 5: Corporate Inversions by Year 1982-2016 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Corporate Inversion Process: Stock and Asset Inversions 
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Figure 7: Corporate Structure Pre- and Post-Inversion 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Ingersoll-Rand Corporate Inversion Process 
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Figure 9: Ingersoll-Rand Corporate Structure Pre- and Post-Inversion 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Permanently Reinvested Foreign Earnings and Firm-Specific 9-Day 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns.  
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Figure 11: Intangible Assets, Foreign Sales, Tax Haven Subsidiaries and Debt to Equity 
of Selected Firms over the UK Corporate Tax Reform Period. 
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